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Article

Rights for Sale
Tsilly Dagan† & Talia Fisher††
INTRODUCTION
In the 2000 presidential election numerous websites encouraged Nader voters in swing states like Michigan, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Pennsylvania to swap their votes with Al Gore
supporters in Republican-dominated states like Texas.1 The
idea behind these initiatives was to enhance Gore‘s chances of
winning the Democratic-pledged electors in the swing states,
while preserving Nader‘s share of the national popular vote for
funding purposes.2 Should the legal system have allowed Ralph
Nader supporters residing in swing states to swap their voting
rights with Gore supporters residing in Republican-dominated
states? What about the sale of voting rights for money? Or, to
take a broader perspective, should the legal system allow the
exchange or sale of other rights, such as tax benefits? Assume,
for example, a taxpayer considering a contribution of $1000 to
her favorite charity, who has no taxable income by which to enjoy the tax benefit. Should she be able to sell her deduction to
another taxpayer so that she can enjoy at least part of the incentive provided by the Government?
At first glance, markets for governmentally provided benefits—whether voting rights or tax attributes—may seem prob† Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University, Israel.
†† Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. The authors would like to thank
Adi Ayal, Eyal Benvenisti, Hanoch Dagan, Yoav Doatn, Yuval Feldman, Assaf
Hamdani, Tobie Harris, Kim Krawiec, Roy Kreitner, Shacahr Lifshitz, Tali
Margalit, Menny Mautner, Barak Medina, Lior Mishali, Jacob Nussim, Lisa
Philipps, Ariel Porat, Orna Rabinowitz-Einy, Jeff Rachlinski, Segev Re‘em,
Linda Sigin, and the participants at faculty workshops at Osgoode Hall School
of Law, Bar Ilan University, and Hebrew University Public Law Forum. Copyright © 2011 by Tsilly Dagan and Talia Fisher.
1. See Marc J. Randazza, The Constitutionality of Online Vote Swapping,
34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1302–06 (2001) (discussing vote swapping websites
during the 2000 presidential election).
2. Id. at 1303.
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lematic. Yet for public entitlements such as pollution quotas,
trade between polluters who do not fully utilize their quotas
and those who wish to utilize the surplus seems natural and is
actually encouraged.3 Can the differences in treatment be normatively justified? Does it make sense to overwhelmingly reject
a market in tax benefits or the sale of votes for money, while
allowing trade amongst potential polluters? In an attempt to
resolve these puzzles this Article reexamines existing conventions regarding the alienability of these and other public
entitlements.
The rights that individuals enjoy in relation to the government are of assorted types, and include: voting rights, the
right to trial, procedural safeguards in criminal trial (such as
the right against self-incrimination), the right to public education, the right to pollute, as well as various subsidies and tax
attributes.4 For simplicity, we term these rights ―Public Entitlements‖ (PEs). These rights are usually considered from the
vertical, individual-government perspective.5 This paper, in
contrast, moves the spotlight to the currently neglected horizontal, individual-individual viewpoint, focusing on the alienability of the rights. The new perspective of this paper—namely
combining the discussion of alienability and public entitlements—offers new insights with regard to each of these
concepts.
First, expanding the horizons of the alienability discussion
beyond its traditional arenas of taboo markets (such as organs,

3. See Andrew M. Wolman, Effluent Trading in the United States and
Australia, 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 7–9 (2003) (providing a brief
history of pollution trading).
4. See Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403,
1410–11 (2009); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 936–37 (1985). Of course, characterizing
these attributes as benefits rather than costs or as rights versus duties depends upon one‘s baseline. See Rose-Ackerman, supra, for a further discussion
of the baseline issue and for a distinction between alienable and inalienable
rights and duties. The baseline question, and its derivative right/duty classification, is immaterial to our current project which focuses on the alienabilityinalienability issue. Obviously there is interdependency between the alienability and the baseline issues: whether or not a certain Public Entitlement is
alienable may affect preferences regarding it and, as a result, may impact its
initial allocation as well as the political process leading to such allocation. See
Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 347.
5. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 931 n.2 (identifying works
that discuss the traditional view of property rights and the law).
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babies and sexuality)6 to the unexplored terrain of PEs accentuates the complexity of alienability. Unlike the above mentioned classic cases—whose alienability entails concerns of a
similar nature, typically translating into a binary ―on/off‖ approach—the PE arena reveals the richness of the normative
considerations underlying alienability, ranging from efficiency,
to distribution, commodification, autonomy, and democratic
participation.7 This complexity of normative underpinnings allows the dismantling of the dichotomy between alienable and
inalienable resources and the conversion of this conceptually
deficient binarism into an array of legal mechanisms. We argue
that the binary choice between alienability and inalienability is
over-simplistic, if not outright arbitrary.8 Full-blown alienability and complete inalienability are actually two endpoints on a
continuum of legal techniques that serve a variety of normative
goals. Accordingly, we present a detailed framework of such intermediate alienability techniques—ranging from total inalienability, to gifts, to non-monetary exchanges, to full marketability. One object of our Article is thus to expose the modularity of
alienability and facilitate creative ways for its use in promoting
a wide array of normative goals.
Second, viewing public entitlements through the currently
neglected horizontal prism of alienability enriches our understanding of PEs and enhances the appreciation of their capacity
as public policy instruments. In arguing that there is nothing
inherently inalienable about public entitlements, and adding
the alienability layer to the concept of PEs, we expose a malleable feature of these entitlements currently viewed, unreflec-

6. See Fennell, supra note 4, at 1405 (providing a recent survey of the
literature on these topics).
7. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 937– 41 (discussing a range of
factors to consider in analyzing restrictions on alienability).
8. In so doing, we expand on Rose-Ackerman‘s ―modified alienability‖
conceptualization, which recognized instances of partial inalienability where
―sales are forbidden, but gifts are permitted and may even be encouraged by
state policy.‖ Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 935. We also build on the suggestion that alienability is an adjustable dimension of property ownership as
opposed to a ―binary switch to be turned on or off . . . .‖ Fennell, supra note 4,
at 1408. Fennell goes on to demonstrate this non-binarism with a host of examples ranging from limits on the occurrence of a transfer (through taxes,
procedural requirements, and other means), to restrictions on the transfer
price (such as price floors or ceilings), and triggering conditions for a shift of
control or penalties. Id. at 1443–51.
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tively, as unitary and rigid.9 A second object of the Article is
thus to engage in fragmentation of public entitlements.
We apply the insights regarding the modularity of alienability and PEs using the counter-intuitive example of tax benefits for charitable contributions. Tax attributes, in general, and
tax benefits for charitable contributions, in particular, are currently allocated on a taxpayer basis.10 They are considered inherently personal and inalienable: ―the folk definition of ‗taxes‘
that governs our fiscal language apparently holds that favorable tax attributes, such as credits and deductions, cannot properly be traded . . . .‖11 This Article argues that such restrictions
on the alienability of tax benefits are neither necessary nor desirable. Rather, there could be considerable benefits to constituting a market in tax attributes for charitable contributions in
terms of promoting the social goals underlying them.
9. Conventional wisdom views public entitlements as inalienable, or at
least considerably limited in alienability. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 745 (1964) (―In addition to being revocable without
compensation, most forms of largess are subject to considerable limitations on
their use. Social Security cannot be sold or transferred. A television license
can be transferred only with FCC permission.‖). According to Susan RoseAckerman:
Following Charles Reich, many commentators view government
transfer programs as creating a kind of ‗new property.‘ If so, the new
property rights are often conditionally coercive. In general, people
cannot sell or give away their benefits to others, and for some benefits, such as public housing, people forfeit their claim to a service by
not using it. Even the right to receive straight cash grants through a
welfare program with no restrictions on use is not a pure property
right. An eligible person can give the payments she receives to anyone
but cannot transfer the right to receive these payments.
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 959 (quoting Reich, supra, at 733). As we will
show, concerns over full-fledged alienability can be addressed through targeted restrictions on different dimensions of alienability without resorting to
complete inalienability—leading to a range of formulations of PEs starting
with completely inalienable entitlements, through entitlements that can only
be transferred via gifts or trades in kind, and ending with fully marketable
entitlements.
10. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case
for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006) (―Currently the vast
majority of tax incentives operate through deductions or exclusions, which link
the size of the tax preference to a household‘s marginal tax bracket.‖).
11. DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT‘S
MARCH TOWARD BANKRUPTCY 17 (2007). Shaviro goes on to describe and critique this assumption regarding the inalienability of tax benefits. See id. at 17–
19. In addition to denying the alienability of tax benefits, policy makers constantly seek ways to curtail tax planning and tax sheltering. See Leo Katz, In
Defense of Tax Shelters, 26 VA. TAX REV. 799, 801–09 (2007) (arguing that tax
planning and tax sheltering leads to inefficiencies and deadweight loss).
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In order to substantiate our claims, we start out by unveiling the normative considerations at the base of the question of
alienability. We focus on the classic normative building blocks
of the alienability debate—efficiency, distribution, autonomy,
personhood, and democratic participation—and use PE examples to illustrate how these considerations operate. We then use
these normative considerations as the framework for constructing intermediate alienability techniques. Namely, we demonstrate how the normative equilibria formed by the interaction
between efficiency, distribution, autonomy, personhood, and
participation translate into specific alienability mechanisms
that run along two axes: The Potential Transferees Axis and
The Mode of Transfer Axis.12 The Potential Transferees Axis
distinguishes between alienability regimes in which the resource can be transferred to a restricted set of recipients and
alienability regimes in which the resource can be transferred to
an unrestricted group of transferees. This axis, we claim, reflects the classic tension between distribution and efficiency.
The Mode of Transfer Axis distinguishes between modes of
alienability based upon the nature of the transaction. As will be
demonstrated, this axis differentiates between sales, barters,
gifts, and waiver of the resource—reflecting different forms and
relative weights of autonomy, personhood, and participationrelated considerations. The intersection of these two axes generates seven techniques of alienability (along the alienability
spectrum) and matches them with specific normative equilibria. We conclude with the application of our theory to trade in
tax benefits for charitable contributions. The application of our
model will show how specific alienability regimes for the provision of tax benefits in the context of charitable contributions
lead to more efficient allocation of those benefits, reinforce distributive goals, and facilitate taxpayer autonomy, personhood,
and participation.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I surveys the
normative considerations underlying the question of alienability by using examples from the PE arena. Part II uses these
normative considerations in order to construct intermediate
alienability techniques: spelling out and exemplifying our taxonomy of alienability mechanisms. Part III concludes with the
application of our theory to trade in tax benefits for charitable
contributions.
12. See infra Figure 1.
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I. THE NORMATIVE BUILDING BLOCKS OF
ALENABILITY
Individuals are entitled to a multitude of rights vis-à-vis
the government. These can include voting rights, the right to
trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right to public
education, the right to pollute, as well as various subsidies and
tax attributes.13 These rights differ from one another in several
respects: their substantive contents, their normative goals, the
constitutional protections provided to them, and how they are
allocated and ultimately distributed.14 Despite these differences, however, all share the common characteristic of governing the individual‘s interaction with the government.15 It is this
feature that attracts the attention of lawyers and dominates
the discourse on public entitlements.16 However, this vertical
view of PEs, anchored in the interface between individual and
government, overlooks their horizontal dimension, relating to
the potential interaction among individuals. Understanding
PEs as the object of interaction among individuals links up to a
host of debates emanating from the realm of private law, currently not associated with these rights.17 Our discussion will focus on one such horizontal aspect of public entitlements—their
alienability. In this Part, we set out to connect PEs to the alienability debate and scrutinize them with the analytical tools
provided by the extensive literature on alienability.
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, the issue of PE
alienability can be illustrated by way of comparing the assignment of voting rights, on the one hand, and the allocation of
pollution quotas, on the other. The right to vote is considered
13. See Reich, supra note 9, at 734 –37 (describing various entitlements
from the government that can be considered in the context of property rights).
14. See generally id. (describing various forms of government entitlements
and the relationship between individuals and the government with respect to
those entitlements).
15. See id. at 756 (―The recipient of [government benefits], whether an organization or an individual, feels the government‘s power.‖).
16. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (40th
Anniversary ed. 2002) (exploring the interaction of competitive capitalism and
the role of government in the market); Reich, supra note 9 (discussing the
dominance of the government‘s programs and how individuals interact with
those programs).
17. Examples may include issues of unjust enrichment (which may arise
when one individual appropriates another‘s PE), torts (when one individual
impairs another‘s ability to enjoy a PE, when one is harmed by another‘s use
of a PE use by another, or when one induces the government to breach a PE),
and contracts.
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an inalienable right.18 This inalienability is grounded on a social pre-commitment to a certain distribution of voting rights
among the public (one vote per person).19 Pollution quotas, by
contrast, are designed as tradable entitlements.20 The emphasis is placed on the aggregate consumption of these benefits, as
opposed to their ultimate distribution among various individuals, thus allowing for the emergence of a market for pollution
quotas (and for a quota per dollar model).21 In these respects,
voting rights and pollution quotas represent two antithetical
paradigms of PE alienability regimes. Despite their disparate
outcomes, however, it is our contention that they are premised
on similar normative infrastructures. Our discussion will now
proceed to expose these shared normative underpinnings—the
classic considerations of efficiency, distribution, autonomy, personhood, and democratic participation—that emerge as the
building blocks of the alienability debate. Our application of
these normative considerations to the context of Public Entitlements will lead to a nuanced landscape of PE alienability,
which, in turn, will be the first step toward our construction—
in the next part—of alienability as a non-binary choice.
A. EFFICIENCY
Under conditions of perfect competition and zero transaction costs, the ―market produces and distributes [commodities]
with unsurpassed efficiency and in unsurpassed abundance.‖22
Where no market failures exist, market forces ensure that resources end up in the hands of the highest value users.23 In the
absence of a market, those to whom resources are allocated
may initially derive a suboptimal value from their consumption. Put differently, marketability enhances the value of the
resource for the initial holder because resources that can be
18. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324
(2000) (describing the general illegality of vote buying in the United States).
19. See id. at 1328 (―Modern society views vote buying with opprobrium.‖).
20. See Charles W. Howe, Tradable Discharge Permits: Functioning, Historical Applications, and International Potential, 4 COLO. J. INT‘L ENVTL. L. &
POL‘Y 370, 376–79 (1993) (discussing various instances of tradable pollution
permits in the United States).
21. See id. at 371–76 (discussing the functioning of a pollution quota
system).
22. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 167 (1993).
23. See Michael Abramowicz, The Law and Markets Movement, 49 AM. U.
L. REV. 327, 387 (1999) (―[M]arket mechanisms tend to allocate goods to their
highest valuing users.‖).
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sold are typically worth more than parallel resources that cannot be sold.24 Marketability is also an efficient mechanism for
conveying information as to the potential market value of a
given resource.25 The market gives clear one-dimensional indications as to the value of the resource, precluding the need to
invest in highly specialized and complicated processes of information gathering.26 Obviously, under conditions of market failure—e.g., imperfect information, strategic barriers, or externalities—regulating the market or partially restricting alienability
could be necessary.27 In fact, as noted by Susan RoseAckerman28 and Richard Epstein,29 inalienability can sometimes serve as a cost-effective alternative to restrictions on acquisition or use. As demonstrated by Lee Ann Fennell, restrictions on alienability can also provide ex-ante benefits in
mitigating hold outs, commons and anti-commons tragedies, as
well as information asymmetries.30
These market failures notwithstanding, the abovementioned efficiency considerations can be extended to publicly
provided entitlements as well. In fact, the existing practice of
tradable pollution quotas is reflective of such infiltration of
market logic to the PE realm. Thus, under conditions of perfect
24. Easterbrook, supra note 4 (―A right that cannot be sold is worth less
than an otherwise-identical right that may be sold. Those who believe in the
value of constitutional rights should endorse their exercise by sale as well as
their exercise by other action.‖); see also IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE
STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 45– 47 (2005) (defining and discussing
option value).
25. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 246, 246 (1976) (―[T]he price system is
conventionally praised as an efficient way of transmitting the information required to arrive at a Pareto optimal allocation of resources . . . .‖).
26. See id. (―[T]he price system conveys all the information from the informed individuals to the uninformed.‖).
27. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 938– 40.
28. Id. at 937– 41.
29. Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970,
971–78 (1985).
30. See generally Fennell, supra note 4. Fennell emphasizes three efficiency-based arguments supporting inalienability. First, inalienability rules might
reduce the incidence of holdout or hold-up problems: rather than dealing with
the owners‘ veto power through liability rules, inalienability can encourage ex
ante the self-selection of owners who are likely to be relatively high-valuing
users over the long run. Id. at 1438– 42. Second, inalienability can serve as an
alternative means for addressing strategic dilemmas, such as commons and
anti-commons tragedies. Id. Third, carefully designed inalienability rules can
more efficiently overcome information asymmetries through the self-selection
process, prompting high-valuing users to identify themselves. Id. at 1453–55.
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competition, markets for public entitlements can improve their
allocation, as well as enhance their value to the initial holder.
The ―price tagging‖ of public entitlements would improve the
ability of citizens to estimate their value, as well as constitute a
good signaling mechanism for the social planner to better align
the level of supply of these entitlements with the social
optimum.
B. DISTRIBUTION
Distribution considerations are often associated with inalienability. In transactions that consistently disadvantage certain segments of the population, distributive considerations
may justify the restriction of alienability as a means to prevent
regressivity.31 Moreover, when money becomes a hegemonic
type of power and encroaches on other forms of valuation, restrictions on alienability may preserve the acoustic separation
among the various spheres of social capital.32 Put differently,
allowing the conversion of resources and rights into money
enables the market to infiltrate various arenas of social and political influence. This convergence of formerly incommensurable
arenas could diminish the power of the underprivileged in the
non-market arenas of social and political influence, while, at
the same time, giving the affluent the ability to acquire superior capacities in those same realms.33 Inalienability could be
required, therefore, to preserve the separate currencies and to
prevent collusive concentration of powers between and across
spheres.34 Yet distributive justice considerations do not necessarily dictate the complete preclusion of alienability. In fact, selective use of the alienability device can promote redistribution.
In light of the fact that marketability enhances the value of resources, allowing for only certain underprivileged segments of
the population to become market players could have a progres31. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1114 (1972) (―Whether an entitlement may be sold or not often affects
directly who is richer and who is poorer.‖).
32. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 932–33.
33. The distributive considerations we are referring to are obviously not
limited to income distribution, but, rather, may include distribution on the basis of other characteristics. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED
150 (1992); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31, at 1098.
34. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1480 (1989) (―A different sort of argument for inalienability . . . would focus on increasing the power of one group in the trade in relation
to another.‖).
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sive effect. Think, for example, of body organs. While allowing
for the free market sale of organs may have adverse distributive effects in that only the wealthy would be able to purchase
them, restricting the sale of body organs to be purchased only
by a central authority—for subsequent allocation on a needonly basis (rather than to the highest bidder)—may provide sellers with hard currency (paid by the central authority) without
such adverse distributive results. Such a seller-only market
mechanism would bypass the double bind entailed in the complete banning of alienability, without privileging the affluent in
access to organs.
This set of claims applies equally to the sphere of public
entitlements. Restricting the alienability of PEs—such as voting rights—could be justified to counter the concern of the concentration of social influence in the hands of privileged
groups.35 At the same time, PE alienability has the potential to
circumvent regressive state policies: like other resources, PEs
are oftentimes allocated regressively, on the basis of certain
demographic and/or social criteria.36 Making these benefits
alienable would enable individuals who were overlooked by the
government in the initial allocation to acquire the benefits irrespective of demographic characteristics. For instance, when
the right to publicly provided fertility treatments is allocated to
married couples only, making this right alienable may allow for
gay couples or singles to enjoy the subsidized treatments,
thereby reducing adverse distributional distortions.
C. AUTONOMY
Alienability can also be justified on the basis of autonomy
considerations. Although the notion of autonomy takes many
forms, it is generally associated with the granting of effective
choices to individuals.37 Alienability and the market enable the
fragmentation of resources and allow for conversion of one type

35. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 963.
36. For an example of a PE allocated in this regressive manner, see Sarah
Wildman, Not Married? Your Insurance Might Not Cover Fertility Treatments,
SLATE ( Mar. 17, 2010, 9:32 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2248051/ (discussing
the allocation of certain health insurance rights based on marital status).
37. For further discussion of the definition of autonomy, see Robert E.
Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 655–59
(2004).
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of resource into another.38 In this way, they enhance the spectrum of choice for individuals. The one-dimensional structure of
the information regarding the value of a given resource, when
translated into market terms, could also improve choicemaking capacity by simplifying it. Moreover, alienability and
the market allow individuals to discard their social identities,
thereby facilitating exit and increasing social mobility.39 It is
our contention that similar autonomy-based considerations
may support PE alienability. Expanding the spectrum of means
by which a public entitlement can be exercised—for instance,
by allowing for its partial or full sale on the market—could expand the spectrum of choices available to the entitlement holder. The current binary structure of all-or-nothing choice with
respect to exercising PEs hinders more creative utilization of
these entitlements. In addition, a market for PEs would increase exit capability, which, in turn, facilitates autonomy.
Yet, alienability could also compromise autonomy in a
number of ways if, for example, what seems like free exchange
is missing a truly consensual basis. Sellers may choose to sell
their resources at sub-market prices due to partial or asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, seller cartelization, or underassessment of risk and long-term interests.40 In
such settings, alienability restrictions can protect sellers from
the detrimental outcomes of their own choices, thus substantively protecting autonomy.41 Moreover, even when the entitlement is traded at market price, some may claim that the
transaction compromises autonomy in those instances where
market price does not fully capture considered judgment of the
entitlement‘s value.42 There may be room to claim that the po38. See David E. Chapman, Retailing Human Organs Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 401 (1983) (arguing that many
people who would not donate their organs would sell them instead).
39. See Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory
After the Right’s Rise, 54 BUFFALO L. REV. 1191, 1266 (2007) ( book review)
(describing the market as a space outside politics).
40. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 939 (identifying the asymmetries
between buyers and sellers). But see Fennell, supra note 4, at 1423–27 (discussing inalienability as a mechanism for mitigating collective action problems).
41. For further discussion in the context of unconstitutional conditions,
see Sullivan, supra note 34 (―Making . . . rights inalienable because citizens
may undervalue the worth of those rights to themselves would be classic paternalism—overruling individuals‘ choices for their own good. Individuals‘
choices may diverge from their ‗best‘ interests for many reasons: for example,
because they underassess risk or undervalue their long-term interests.‖).
42. Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1918–19 (1987) (―Although a house has market value and we can express our
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tential for incompatibility between market price and the social
judgment of value is greater with respect to those resources
likely to be handed out as government entitlements.43 Finally,
in certain contexts, a wider range of options may neither result
in more effective choice, nor in greater autonomy. Too great a
variety of options may obstruct one‘s ability to rationally rank
the different alternatives, due to increased information costs as
well as behavioral effects.44 This may be exacerbated in the
case of less sophisticated market players, who are susceptible
to manipulation by more sophisticated counterparts.45 In addition to choice-related considerations, autonomy justifications
for inalienability also rest on the tension existing between free
exit and communal life. The autonomy-enhancing power of certain communities alongside the benefits of community life derive from barriers to exit placed upon community members. It
is quite plausible that it is those communities that are easiest
to discard that are of the least value to their members and vice
versa, with the family unit a most acute example.46 This line of
autonomy-based objections to alienability applies to the PE
realm no less. Such a problematic exit-community link is well
illustrated by the PE case of voting rights, in which selling
one‘s vote means discarding her voice in the civic community.
Accordingly, autonomy considerations can support restricting
such PE alienability.47

investment in terms of dollars, there is a nonmonetizable, personal aspect to
many people‘s relationships with their homes.‖).
43. Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 158–63 (―[P]roviding goods out of
pooled resources obliterates any connection of specific donors with specific recipients.‖).
44. See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE 102–04, 215–16
(2004).
45. See Sullivan, supra note 34, at 1497–98 (―[One concern about redistribution] recognizes that background inequalities of wealth and resources necessarily determine one‘s bargaining position in relation to government, and
that the poor may have nothing to trade but their liberties.‖).
46. On the other hand, an effective choice to exit makes the decision to
stay a member all the more meaningful. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 111–
13 (discussing the relative ease or difficulty of discarding certain relationships).
47. The problematic exit-community link in the context of PEs is well illustrated by the case of voting rights, which refers to the civic community at
large. By selling one‘s vote, a person discards her voice in the community,
thereby de facto exiting it. See Karlan, supra note 39, at 1710.
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D. PERSONHOOD
Personhood is ordinarily associated with those attributes
that are integral to human identity, including ―one‘s politics,
work, religion, family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism,
experiences, wisdom, moral commitments, [and] character . . . .‖48 Commodifying these attributes, it has been claimed,
can have a reductive effect due to the collapsing of distinguishable spheres of valuation into thin monetary terms.49 The existence of multiple spheres of valuation is crucial to human identity,50 while perceiving life through the unidimensional prism
of market price could flatten and alter self-perception.51 The literature on alienability and commodification focuses on such
limits of the market in regulating human behavior and criticizes the application of market tools to all realms of life.52
In addition to the general commodification critique, it is
useful, we hold, to distinguish between two possible manifestations of commodification, currently weaved together in the literature.53 The two represent distinct bases for evaluating the
desirability of alienability. The first relates to the monetization
of attributes constitutive of identity, what we term ―commodification of resources.‖54 The argument is that the sale of certain
attributes, and perhaps even their subjection to mere market
logic, alters them and transforms their inherent meaning. Paidfor companionship is different from going out with friends;
paid-for care is unlike care by family or friends; selling a kidney is nothing like donating an organ; and sex for money is
very different from sex for love. The second strand of the com48. Radin, supra note 42, at 1906.
49. See id. at 1884.
50. For an argument that resources differ and should differ not only in
how much we value them, but also in how we value them, see ANDERSON, supra note 22, at xiii.
51. See id. (―If different spheres of social life, such as the market, the family and the state, are structured by norms that express fundamentally different ways of valuing people and things, then there can be some ways we ought
to value people and things that can‘t be expressed through market norms.‖).
52. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 42; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4.
53. See ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 217–18 (―When value is represented
as the object of just one generic response, such as desire or pleasure, we don‘t
bother to consider whether the ways we produce and exchange goods adequately express the other ways we properly value them or one another.‖).
54. See id. at 151 (―The goods proper to the personal sphere can only be
realized through gift exchange. They cannot be procured by paying others to
produce them, because the worth of these goods depends upon the motive
people have in providing them.‖).
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modification critique focuses on the problems associated with
commercialization of the interaction between individuals, a
phenomenon we call ―commodification of interactions.‖ Portraying interactions as market transactions and as ―impersonal,
egoistic, exclusive, want-regarding, and oriented to ‗exit‘ rather
than ‗voice‘‖55 strips them of their possible altruistic nature. As
Anderson argues, preserving arenas of non-market behavior
and relationships based on care, altruism, and selflessness
enriches society with essential collective goods.56
Though the issue of commodification was traditionally
raised as an objection to the market,57 there are also commodification effects and personhood-based arguments that support
alienability.58 For example, marketability may have a liberating effect in converting resources into monetary instruments.
The currency of money is democratic, for market players can
effectively discard social identities that restrict participation in
other social institutions and arenas. In a world where money
buys respect, markets can inculcate a sense of value for things
that might be taken for granted when not paid-for.59 For example, inalienability of housework may lead to under-appreciation
of its economic value, whereas its monetization signifies that it
has market value.60 From this perspective, the commodification
of housework is a virtue.
Similar to the other normative considerations, the commodification debate is applicable in the PE context. PEs, like any
other resource, vary in how closely they are connected to, and
55. Id. at 145.
56. Id.
57. E.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household
Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 84 (1997) (―The standard argument
against commodification, often referred to as the ‗commodification critique,‘ is
that certain human attributes or certain resources should lie wholly or partially beyond exchange, because to allow exchange would be inconsistent with a
vision of personhood or human flourishing.‖).
58. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 5 (1996),
(―[C]ommodification, in conceiving of the person as a commodity-trader, implies a certain view of human freedom . . . unrestricted choice about what
goods to trade represents individual freedom, and the maximizing of individual gains from trade represents the individual‘s ideal.‖).
59. Cf. Silbaugh, supra note 57, at 90–95 (supporting use of economic
terms to better recognize and understand the economic aspects of non-market
activities).
60. See id.; Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1618–
19 (1996) (arguing that taxing housework ―would ensure greater resources for
women and would represent a congressional recognition of caretaking responsibilities as valuable and productive labor‖).
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constitutive of, one‘s identity—whether as a person, family
member, community member, or citizen.61 The divergences
among the identity-forming components of the different PEs
lead to varying results when translated into monetary terms:
whereas, for some PEs, the anonymity and abandonment of social identity enabled by their marketability has a liberating effect, for others this dissociation entails significant costs in selfperception.62
E. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
Alienability can also be justified on considerations of democratic participation. When markets operate in a competitive
manner, individual players cannot single-handedly control or
alter the operation of the market forces.63 In this respect, markets are mechanisms for the decentralization of power in society, serving as an alternative to the government decisionmaking process and constraining centralistic, otherwise absolute, state power.64
Alienability in the context of certain PEs could further
augment the potential of the market to counterbalance government forces. PEs such as voting rights by their very nature
approximate the decentralizing effect of the market forces.65
Thus, the initial allocation of voting rights to all citizens in effect spreads decision-making power equally among them, providing each individual with a voice and marginal decisionmaking power. Transforming decision making into a marketable commodity and creating a market for voting rights would
facilitate additional venues of democratic participation (along61. Sullivan, supra note 34, at 1484 –85 (explaining that some attributes
are ―so closely connected to the person that their alienation would injure personal identity‖ whereas other approaches ―rank different constitutional rights
as more or less central to personal identity‖).
62. One example of such an identity-constituting PE is the right to vote,
which plays a role in shaping a person‘s civic identity. The exchange of such
rights for money ―is a form of dismemberment. If citizens could purchase and
sell [such] rights, they would have a different and inferior conception both of
those . . . rights and of themselves.‖ Id. at 1485.
63. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 14. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Politics By
Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1710–11 (1999) (―[T]he right to vote serves
a powerful expressive function. This notion is captured in the idea of ‗civic inclusion‘ and in the various ways the franchise is used to delineate who is and
is not a full member of the community.‖).
64. Id. at 15.
65. Cf. id. at 15–21 (arguing that the market functions to preserve political freedom).
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side the existing option of exercising the right to vote), in the
form of both passive and active participation.66 Passive participation refers to mere waiving of the right, which can be a form
of protest. Active participation through alienability may enrich
the ways in which an initial right-holder can voice her preferences by channeling her right to vote to potential voters.67 In
addition, a market for PEs would establish an option for the
purchase of double voice by individuals who have strong preferences for affecting the decision-making process.
However, it is exactly these considerations that may tilt
the scales against making PEs alienable and, even more so,
marketable. Though the trade of PEs for money has a preference-revealing and liberating potential, as discussed above, it
may also distort the picture regarding participation preferences.68 Indeed, those who purchase additional voice may not
necessarily be those who value it most, but rather often merely
those who can afford the purchase, and vice versa.69 This could
be the reason why democratic participation considerations tend
to tip in favor of inalienability.70
F. FROM BUILDING BLOCKS TO RECONSTRUCTION
As we have shown, alienability is consistent with each of
the five normative considerations discussed thus far—
efficiency, distribution, autonomy, personhood, and democratic
participation—albeit in a complex and multifaceted manner.
On some levels, all of these considerations support alienability;
yet on other levels, they each justify inalienability. Nonetheless, these internal tensions within each of the normative con66. For an analogous use of this distinction in the context of citizenship see
Shai Lavi, Citizenship Revocation as Punishment: On the Modern Bond of Citizenship and its Criminal Breach, 61 U TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 7), available at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences2/
Constitutionalism09-Lavi.pdf.
67. For further discussion of active and passive participation in the context of voting rights, see infra Part II.7.
68. See Hanoch Dagan, Political Money, 8 ELECTION L.J. 349, 350–51
(2009) (arguing that in the context of political monetary contributions, money
can be a legitimate means for expressing preferences, though money reflects
the intensity of preferences in a ―particularly distorted way due to the effects
of wealth‖).
69. Id. at 356.
70. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 34, at 1483–84 (noting that the distributive
effect of an inalienability rule depends on the power of the buying and selling
classes and that ―[t]he ‗purchase‘ of rights may permit otherwise ephemeral
majorities to aggrandize their power at the expense of entrenched minorities‖).
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siderations do not obscure the conclusion that, on balance, efficiency and autonomy tend to gravitate towards alienability
whereas distribution, personhood, and democratic participation
lean towards inalienability. These opposing orientations give
rise to an external tension among the various considerations in
the alienability context. Therefore, framing the choice between
alienability and inalienability as a binary all-or-nothing decision turns what we have shown to be a nuanced and multifaceted matter into a crude and simplistic bottom line. There is
nothing inherent or essential in the association of each of the
specific normative considerations with either alienability or inalienability. Even if alienability poses challenges in terms of
the various normative ends, this need not rule it out altogether.
Indeed, restricting full alienability need not collapse into complete inalienability, or vice versa. The challenges posed by alienability are not uniform and, thus, the remedies called for need
not be of a single nature, both in degree and kind. For example,
the personhood problems associated with commodification of a
resource as a result of full marketability are unlike those deriving from the distributive concerns associated with providing
the wealthy with greater decision-making power. The same
holds true with respect to the considerations supporting alienability. The efficiency benefits associated with placing a given
resource in the hands of its most valuable user differ from the
autonomy justifications and liberating effects of extra choice.
We suggest, therefore, that tinkering with various aspects of
alienability in a manner that accommodates these differential
normative ends will assist in crafting creative alienability
mechanisms better suited to the full range of normative equilibria. With this insight in mind, we lay out below a modular and
more nuanced set of alienability mechanisms, better suited to a
non-binary conception.
II. A NON-BINARY CONCEPTION OF ALIENABILITY
We will now construct alienability mechanisms that accommodate our non-binary conception of the choice between
alienability and inalienability, using the basic normative foundations of efficiency, distribution, autonomy, personhood, and
democratic participation. As mentioned above, the central premise of our argument is that the choice between alienability
and inalienability need not be a binary all-or-nothing decision.
Integrating the five normative considerations into a nuanced
model of alienability yields a spectrum of choices running along
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two axes: the mode of transfer and the set of potential
transferees.
The Mode of Transfer Axis breaks down into four distinct
categories according to the gradual means by which the initial
right holder can dispose of a PE: waiver (non-consumption); gift
(transfer for no consideration); barter (transfer for nonmonetary consideration); and sale (transfer for monetary consideration). The Potential Transferees Axis divides into two
broad categories, each referring to the potential transferees to
whom a PE can be transferred: unrestricted (transfer may be to
any member of the public at large); and restricted (transfer
may only be to a pre-selected group of potential recipients including the government). Pre-selected recipients can include
members of communities distinct in their religious, ethnic,
ideological, or cultural affiliation; groups that share unique
traits, such as a socio-economic background, income level,
gender, physical abilities, or sexual orientation; and the family
unit. The intersection of these two axes creates seven71 applicable categories of alienability mechanisms, as illustrated by the
table below:
Figure 1:
Potential Transferees Axis

Waiver

Mode of

Gift

Transfer
Axis

Barter

Sale

Restricted Transferees

Unrestricted Transferees

Inalienability

Meaningless

A

B

Restricted Gift

Unrestricted Gift

C

D

Restricted Barter

Unrestricted Barter

E

F

Restricted Sale

Unrestricted Sale

G

(full alienability)
H

71. Category B is irrelevant in the PE context because individuals can only waive those PEs to the government as opposed to the public at large.

108

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:90

Each box in the table (with the exception of Box B),
represents what we refer to as a specific ―mechanism of alienability‖ and reflects a particular composite of the normative considerations of efficiency, distribution, autonomy, and democratic participation. As a general rule of thumb, the Potential
Transferees Axis correlates with the efficiency-distribution
tradeoff, whereas the distinctions running along the Mode of
Transfer Axis reflect autonomy-personhood-participation balances of various sorts. In other words, mechanisms that fall
under the Restricted Transferees Column (Categories A, C, E,
G) reflect a greater concern for distributive justice,72 whereas
the mechanisms in the parallel Unrestricted Transferees Column (Categories B, D, F, H) are more attuned to the promotion
of efficiency.73
Similarly, the categories along the Mode of Transfer Axis
are distinguishable on autonomy-,74 personhood-,75 and democratic participation-related76 criteria. The Sale Row (Categories
G,H) relates to instances where enabling the conversion of a PE
into monetary terms would enhance autonomy and choicemaking capacity. These categories target cases in which complete commodification of both the resource and the interaction
between the parties facilitates autonomy. The Barter Row
(Categories E,F) represents a different class of cases, in which
there is opposition to setting a monetary price tag on the particular PE, but commercializing the party interaction is not
considered problematic. In other words, by allowing quid-proquo exchanges while prohibiting monetary consideration, this
set of mechanisms reflects a particular type of personhood and
anti-commodification tendencies, countering the commodification of the resource rather than the commodification of the party interaction. The Gift Row (Categories C,D), which precludes
all forms of consideration, reflects a more complete version of
anti-commodification sentiments: for the PEs falling under this
category, there is opposition to the very quid-pro-quo nature of
the interaction between the parties, not only to the commodification of the resource. Still, the gift allows for the use of the
particular PE also by individuals other than the initial right
holder.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37– 47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 48–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text.
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This brings us to the final row: Waiver (Category A). The
waiver category relates to instances in which the only permitted use is self-consumption of the PE by the initial right holder,
who, although she can choose to forfeit it, cannot transfer the
entitlement to others (and therefore cannot exchange it or sell
it). The divide between waiver and gift correlates with the distinction between the two forms of democratic participation discussed above: passive and active participation.77 Waiver offers
only passive participation in the decision-making process (in
addition to self consumption of the PE), whereas the gift category represents cases in which the initial right holder can not
only consume the right herself or waive it altogether, but also
affect the channeling of the right to other potential users, thus
actively participating in the decision-making process as to its
ultimate distribution.
The rough typology that we sketch above is by no means
exhaustive. We are surely not arguing that each of the normative considerations should be restricted to its assigned column
or row in the above table. Their scope is obviously broader than
that. For example, preferring a gift mechanism to sale may
surely emanate from distributive justice considerations and not
solely from personhood rationales.78 Likewise, allowing for
transactions with unrestricted transferees rather than limiting
the range of recipients may stem from autonomy rationales and
not only efficiency considerations. Our admittedly stylized
presentation is meant only to provide a preliminary demonstration of the center of gravitation with respect to each normative
mix. We will now elaborate on the normative equilibrium in
each of the categories using illustrative examples—some of
which refer to existing practices while others are yet to be implemented. A caveat is called for, however: the examples we
provide are preliminary in nature. They are intended to serve
as an initial context for each of the categories rather than to
provide a comprehensive analysis or a normative prescription.
As befitting the general thrust of the paper, the examples we
chose as illustrations for each of the categories below all belong
to the PE domain. Obviously, the categories of alienability we
77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
78. See W. Stephen Westermann, A Theory of Autonomy Entitlements:
One View of the Cathedral Nave Dedicated to Constitutional Rights and Other
Individual Liberties 4 n.8 (Apr. 26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=977964 (arguing that ―one possible motivation for
permitting gifts but not sales of human organs is to avoid the regressive result
of disproportionate sales by citizens who are poor‖).
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construct can also be applied outside of the realm of public entitlements; therefore, similar archetypical examples for each of
the categories can be found, but this discussion is beyond the
scope of our paper.
A. UNRESTRICTED SALE: POLLUTION QUOTAS
The alienability mechanism represented by Category H is
the unrestricted sale of Public Entitlements. Pollution quotas
offer a paradigmatic example of this category.79 Here, the normative considerations gravitate towards efficiency. Under conditions of perfect competition and zero transaction costs, tradable pollution quotas end up in the hands of the highest value
users, regardless of their initial allocation.80 Initial holders of
pollution rights who yield sub-optimal value from their direct
consumption are incentivized to sell their quotas to higher value users.81 In addition, implementing a tradable quotas regime
creates incentives for the initial right-holders to invest additional resources in pollution minimization research and development, because manufacturers that succeed in such innovations will enjoy a competitive advantage and enhance their
trading possibilities.82 A final advantage of pollution quota
trading is that it holds aggregate pollution levels steady at the
desired social level.83
Restricting such trade by limiting the potential recipients
of the pollution quotas could undermine these positive effects.84

79. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341–51 (1985) (discussing a system of
tradable pollution rights); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls:
Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 10–11, 21–
24 (discussing strategies for preserving environmental resources).
80. Wolman, supra note 3, at 3.
81. Abramowicz, supra note 23, at 353–54 (―[P]ollution rights will tend to
flow to those for whom pollution abatement is most expensive . . . .‖).
82. James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 374
(1989) (―Because costs for controlling emissions vary among plants, some
sources will install pollution control devices, reduce their emissions, and sell
their excess emissions use rights . . . . Over time, polluting becomes more expensive, and polluters have a greater incentive to reduce their emissions.‖).
83. Howe, supra note 20, at 373.
84. See, e.g., Tripp & Dudek, supra note 82, at 387 (citing a Wisconsin water pollution allocation program‘s failure as due, at least in part, to the fact
that the rights are not freely tradable amongst polluters, ―which impairs the
value of the rights‖). But see Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 79, at 1350 (asserting that the market system might permit ―the creation of relatively high
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When achieving efficient results as described is the dominant
social goal, the unrestricted transferees option would be the
superior choice.85 Moreover, the sale of pollution quotas does
not seem to entail any significant autonomy-related or personhood concerns: pollution quotas are not intimately connected to
one‘s personhood, involve no interpersonal relations, and are
not constitutive of identity.86 Nor does the sale of pollution quotas give rise to any anti-commodification objections, either with
regard to the object of trade (pollution quotas) or with respect
to the actual commercialization of the interaction between the
parties.87 Hence, the choice of the sale rubric on the Mode of
Transfer Axis emerges as optimal.
B. RESTRICTED SALE: POLLUTION QUOTAS REFINED
The main opposition to the notion of tradable pollution quotas emanates from environmental justice advocates, who are
concerned about the distributive implications of such a trade
regime.88 The central argument they raise is that the classic
economic analysis of tradable pollution quotas presupposes an
concentrations of particular pollutants in small areas within the larger pollution control region‖ and subsequent toleration of ―hot spots‖).
85. See Abramowicz, supra note 23, at 354 (arguing that trading prices
indicate the cost of additional pollution reduction, allowing companies to
change their strategy, method, or price as the market evolves, and stating that
―[t]his dynamic adjustment could not be achieved if the initial pollution entitlements were fixed‖). But see Wolman, supra note 3, at 3 (―Some economists
have pointed out that in the real world marketable permit systems could experience domination from a single firm or small handful of firms or could fail to
perform well . . . .‖).
86. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral
Perceptions and Civic Enforcement, 36 J.L. & SOC‘Y 501, 519–20, 526–27
(2009). In a study examining how various instruments of environmental regulation affect people‘s moral intuitions, participants had the lowest moral outrage (toward the pollution source) and emotional reaction (to the pollution itself ) to the market-based instrument of environmental taxation. Id. at 508–09,
519 tbl.1. The researchers found that participants had a ―significant tolerance‖
for the use of environmental taxation, positing that this market instrument
had a legitimizing effect from the joint operation of the rule of law (legalizing
the pollution) and the effect of paying for the right to use (pollute) public assets. Id. at 526–27.
87. See id. at 508, 527 (concluding that the study results are contradictory
to the commodification critique, which suggests that use of market-based instruments may be a legitimate mechanism for authorizing use of public
resources).
88. Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography:
Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 580–87 (2001).
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even playing-field on which the market operates.89 However,
they maintain, in the real world, socio-economic factors, income
levels, and racial characteristics all affect the initial platform
where market players act, tipping the scales in favor of certain
groups.90 Due to these inequalities, market-based mechanisms
may fail to distribute environmental benefits fairly, the result
being a disproportionate concentration of pollution quotas in
the hands of certain groups, as well as a disproportionate concentration of pollutants in geographic regions of vulnerable
groups (known as ―pollution hotspots‖).91
It is our contention that this dichotomous framing debate
as a question for or against a tradable quota regime is misleading, since it presumes a binary choice between full marketability and complete inalienability of pollution quotas. As can be
seen from our model, the choice need not be binary, but rather
a continuum of alienability mechanisms is possible. The distributive concerns raised in this debate should be addressed by
moving along the Potential Transferees Axis to the restricted
sale rubric rather than by rejecting the possibility of sale altogether. Restricting the sale of quotas to polluters located within
the same geographic unit would not aggravate the current distribution of pollution, whereas further restricting the buyers of
pollution quotas to polluters located in less polluted areas
would actually have a positive redistributive effect. In other
words, delineating the group of transferees to whom pollution
quotas can be sold would prove beneficial when distributional
concerns are placed at the center. The alienability mechanism
under Category G is well-suited to temper such distributive
justice concerns, without forfeiting all the benefits of trade in
pollution quotas.
C. RESTRICTED BARTER: PLEA-BARGAINING
The alienability mechanism embodied in Category E facilitates exchange in kind of PEs with restricted transferees. A paradigmatic example in this context would be the practice of plea
bargaining, where a defendant effectively exchanges his Fifth
89. See id. at 580–81.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 574 –81. It should be noted, however, that any tradable quota
regime operates under conditions of a preexisting allocation of pollution and
polluters. Polluting plants are often located in lower-class neighborhoods to
begin with, and, in light of this initial allocation, allowing for the tradability of
pollution quotas may often inflate the levels of pollution in such areas. Id. at
580–81.
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Amendment right against self-incrimination,92 his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial,93 and his right to appeal94 for
punishment concessions from the prosecution.95
The object of exchange in the case of plea bargaining—the
defendant‘s liberty—is fundamental to one‘s personhood.96 This
fundamentality justifies its incommensurability across spheres
of valuation.97 At the same time, exchanges within a single
sphere—for the same type of currency—do not raise similar
personhood concerns. Thus, a waiver of the right against selfincrimination (a cost in terms of one‘s liberty) can only be exchanged for punishment concessions (a benefit in terms of his
liberty).98 Relinquishing liberty for monetary consideration, in
contrast, could have a reductive effect on the meaning of liberty.99 This anti-commodification stance with respect to the nature of the resource being exchanged is what sets plea bargains
92. See Brenna K. DeVaney, The “No-Contact” Rule: Helping or Hurting
Criminal Defendants in Plea Negotiations?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 933, 942
(2001) (―[E]ntering into a plea bargain . . . [t]he defendant is essentially waiving many significant rights, including a trial by a jury of peers, the confrontation of witnesses, and the right to challenge the evidence against him.‖).
93. Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 801
(2003) (claiming that the right to a jury trial or the right against selfincrimination is routinely bargained away in the criminal arena, in exchange
for sentence reduction).
94. E.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151–54 (1990); see also
Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1693 (2001) (arguing that defendants bargain away their
right to appeal through plea bargaining).
95. Note that our model is aimed at devising alienability mechanisms
with regard to PEs. However, analogous considerations and similar mechanisms could apply in the non-PE context. A parallel, non-PE test case falling
under Category E is the example of blood bank donations. Allowing the exchange of blood donations solely for blood insurance while banning sale of
blood for monetary consideration is supported by similar, non-commodificatory
rationales.
96. See Mazzone, supra note 93, at 827 (―[M]aking constitutional rights
alienable undermines the individual dignity that these rights are meant to
protect.‖).
97. In light of the link between liberty and autonomy, we would like to
also preserve the option of waiving these procedural safeguards. We do not
highlight this angle in our discussion here simply because, at this point, we
wish to focus solely on the sale-barter distinction, as opposed to the inalienability-barter perspective.
98. See Mazzone, supra note 93, at 805 (discussing the mechanics of waiver of right against self-incrimination in exchange for punishment concessions).
99. See Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can‘t Buy: The Moral Limits of
Markets, Address at Brasenose College, Oxford ( May 11–12, 1998), in 21 THE
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94 (2000) (providing a discussion of
the corruptive effects of comodification).
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apart from pollution quotas and, more generally, what distinguishes sellable PEs from those exchangeable in kind only.
Unlike the reservations regarding price-tagging liberty and
commodifying the object of exchange in plea bargaining, similar
anti-commodificatory concerns do not arise with regard to the
actual bargaining process between the prosecution and defense
or to the quid-pro-quo nature of their interaction.100 In fact,
opening the criminal justice arena to negotiations enhances the
defendant‘s decisional autonomy101 and her right to exert effective control over the manner in which her fate is determined.102
Thus, while reducing the object of exchange (liberty in our example) into monetary terms impairs personhood by collapsing
distinguishable spheres of valuation into market terms, the
ability of the parties to exchange resources within a single
sphere of valuation (in our case, liberty for liberty) enhances
their choice-making capacity.103
D. UNRESTRICTED BARTER: SCHOOL VOUCHERS
The alienability mechanism represented by Category F is
barters—exchanges in kind only—with unrestricted transferees: a paradigmatic example in this category is the bartering of
public school vouchers.104 Assume that a variety of high schools
in a hypothetical local municipality, offer, in addition to an
identical core curriculum, specific fields of specialization: some
schools focus on the liberal arts and humanities, while others
are more science-oriented. For the purpose of illustration, suppose that under such a regime, each potential student is allo100. But see George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More
Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193, 220–26 (1977) (arguing that an absolute
right to waiver can potentially ―involve [an] unacceptable exploitation of a defendant‘s ignorance or too costly a sacrifice of the need to accomplish or at
least appear to accomplish accuracy‖).
101. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 346– 47 (discussing the exchange of
constitutional rights for monetary and non-monetary benefits).
102. See Dix, supra note 100, at 219 (discussing the notion of defendant
autonomy).
103. For further discussion of the autonomy-related considerations underlying plea-bargaining, see generally Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943
(2007).
104. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (discussing the constitutionality of school vouchers in the context of the Establishment Clause); Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth
Wave in School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613 (advocating for the
adoption of a public school voucher system to alleviate the problems of underresourced schools).
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cated a voucher allowing her to attend the school that is closest
to her place of residence. The reason for this allocation is to ensure enrollment of a relatively equal number of students at
each school. Allowing each student to barter her voucher for
another voucher would be a Pareto improvement in that it
would better tailor education to individual preferences.105
School vouchers would thus end up in the hands of higher value
users, regardless of the original allocation. The unrestricted nature of the barter increases the number of potential transactions, while the alternative of placing restrictions on such exchanges may undermine these positive effects. Thus, when
efficiency through preference satisfaction and enhanced choice
in education are the dominant social goals, the unrestricted recipients (Category F) is preferable to Category E on the Potential Transferees Axis.
If we were to highlight the distributional effect on the efficiency-distribution tradeoff, however, Category E could prove to
be the superior potential transferees option. For example, if it
were to emerge that schools focusing on liberal arts attract a
disproportionate number of female students, while those focusing on the sciences were the favored choice of males—and assuming this to be an objectionable outcome from a social perspective—restricting barters to same-sex recipients could prove
preferable. Allowing female students to exchange vouchers only
with other female students, with the same restriction applied to
male students, would preserve the male-female ratio at each
school. At the same time, the schools would better accommodate the preferences of individuals within each group: females
with a lesser aversion for the sciences would end up in the
science-oriented schools and a similar result would obtain for
male students preferring the liberal arts.
With regard to the Mode of Transfer Axis, similar claims
can be raised in the context of the right to education as those
made above regarding criminal procedure safeguards. The object of exchange in the context of school vouchers—the individ105. But note, unlike in-kind exchanges, a conversion of school vouchers
into monetary currency could, in effect, distort the preference-revealing
mechanism at their base in those instances when affluent people bid higher
even when their preferences are lower. Disallowing such conversion of vouchers into money by restricting the transaction to a single valuation sphere
(vouchers for vouchers only) would avert these distortions, thus enabling true
preferences to be revealed and different vouchers to be channeled to their
highest-valuing users. This point can obviously be phrased in distribution
terms as well.
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ual‘s right to education—is, like liberty, formative of one‘s personhood.106 Whereas exchanging one form of education for
another form of education increases the range of currently
available choices and, at the same time, sustains the student‘s
personhood and prospective choice-making capacity, relinquishing the right to education altogether for monetary consideration (or for no consideration whatsoever, as in the case of gifts
under Category D) will curtail the future ability to choose from
among alternative ways of life. This justifies the incommensurability of the right to education for money.107 Note, however,
that it is the exchange of education for money that is problematic, rather than the quid-pro-quo nature of the interaction
between the exchanging voucher-holders.
E. UNRESTRICTED GIFT: RIGHT TO FILE SUIT
The Category D mechanism of alienability is gifts—for no
consideration—to members of the public at large, with donations of organs for transplant a classic example in the non-PE
arena.108 In the PE context, a hypothetical example under this
category would be the right to file suit. It could be plausibly
claimed that forbidding all forms of alienability with respect to
such a right—i.e., restricting the victim‘s options to either file
suit herself or waive the right altogether—would undermine
deterrence and hinder compensation in circumstances in which
she lacks the financial, cultural, and emotional resources necessary to access the court.109 Moving from inalienability to a
gift regime on the Mode of Transfer Axis, then, would enable
the transfer of the right to file suit from the victim to more sophisticated players in the legal system. The marginal costs of
additional court proceedings could be lower for the latter than
106. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring) (starting his
reasoning from the viewpoint that education is an essential part of being free).
107. Moreover, for those who insist that education must be essentially
merit-based, arguing that any involvement of money taints the very nature of
education, the possibility of exchange rather than sale of school vouchers
would prevent these negative spillover effects.
108. See generally Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational
Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107 (discussing whether
payment for oocytes is appropriate or if it should be a donation based transaction); Sara Krieger Kahan, Incentivizing Organ Donation: A Proposal to End
the Organ Shortage, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 757 (2009) (addressing current
methods for organ donation and the possibility of financial incentives).
109. See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114
YALE L.J. 697, 736– 42 (2005) (arguing that plaintiffs purchasing tort claims
will prevail more in court).
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the former, turning the action into a positive value claim for
them.110 Such effects can also result from the consolidation, by
a single player, of claims relating to different victims. Moreover, even when the value of the claim does not increase substantially with the transfer of the right, another important social purpose is served by the gift option: individuals who wish
to participate in the public discourse through the legal system
are given access to the courts by enabling them to use original
victims‘ unexercised right to bring suit. At the same time, a
transfer of this right allows the victims themselves to voice
their claims vicariously via the transferees.111 Thus, allowing
for the transfer of the right to sue not only contributes to deterrence, but also enhances participation in public deliberation. In
instances where these normative considerations are of paramount concern, the gift mechanism is preferable to inalienability. Yet there may be cause to object to a progression from gift to
sale. As argued by proponents of the champerty doctrine,112
commodifying the right to sue—especially in the context of
bodily harm—could have the derivative reductive effect of
commodifying the victim‘s bodily integrity.113 The personal nature of the lawsuit could be tainted when traded for monetary
consideration.114
On the Potential Transferees Axis, the ability to transfer
the right to file suit to unrestricted recipients would promote
efficiency and deterrence. Constraining such a transfer with restrictions on the potential recipients of the right could undermine these social objectives by excluding capable litigators for
no good distributive reason.

110. Mass tort cases are a good example in this respect. See id. (discussing
the pooling of torts cases by a purchaser).
111. See id. at 740 (―[T]ransfers of claims allow plaintiffs to obtain better
representation or to bring claims that otherwise would not be worth
bringing . . . .‖).
112. See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
773, 818 (2011) (―The [champerty] doctrine‘s underlying policy is to discourage
excessive, unnecessary, or speculative litigation, which is often associated with
third parties seeking profit for themselves, rather than redress for their
clients, through suits.‖).
113. See Abramowicz, supra note 109, at 704.
114. See id. at 724. For further discussion of the commodification of legal
claims, see id. at 697–779.
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F. RESTRICTED GIFT: CONSCRIPTION EXEMPTION
The Category C mechanism of alienability is gifts—
transfer for no consideration—to a restricted group of recipients. An illustrative example is the right to exemption from
mandatory conscription.115 In countries with mandatory conscription, some communities typically enjoy exemption rights,
usually on religious or cultural grounds.116 In Israel, for instance, the ultra-Orthodox can obtain an exemption from military duty if they prove exclusive devotion of their time to religious study.117 Such rights of exemption are currently
nontransferable and are granted on a case-by-case, renewable
basis.118 The government, however, lacks sufficient information
to detect the most promising religious scholars and those truly
interested in fully applying themselves to their studies.119 This
may lead to over-inclusion of unworthy or less interested religious scholars and under-inclusion of commendable and dedicated ones.120 An alternative allocation mechanism (one that
would fall under Category C) that could alleviate this problem
would be to grant transferable exemption rights but with potential transferees specifically limited to members of the ultra115. See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 943 (1991)
(discussing ―narrow, effectiveness-related exemptions‖ for those unfit to serve,
as well as conscription systems with ―broader policy-related exemptions‖ for
individuals deemed capable of performing worthier roles elsewhere in society).
116. See, e.g., Matthew G. Lindenbaum, Religious Conscientious Objection
and the Establishment Clause in the Rehnquist Court: Seeger, Welsh, Gillette,
and § 6( j) Revisited, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 248 (2003) (discussing
a statute that only exempted members of religious denominations whose tenets forbade the bearing of arms from a mandatory national conscription law
enacted during the Civil War).
117. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP‘T
OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2006),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71423.htm#occterr (explaining Israel‘s Tal Law, which allows ultra-Orthodox Jews to postpone military
service in one-year increments to pursue full-time studies at religious schools).
118. See id. (specifying that individuals exempted from conscription under
the Tal Law must renew their deferment each year by proving they are still
full-time students).
119. See Barak Medina, Political Disobedience in the IDF: The Scope of the
Legal Right of Soldiers to be Excused from Taking Part in Military Activities in
the Occupied Territories, 36 ISR. L. REV. 73, 80 (2002) (suggesting that not all
cases of exemptions granted to ultra-Orthodox Jews by the Tal Law reflect
―full‖ conscientious objection).
120. See id. at 92–95 (discussing the intense political debate and scrutiny
surrounding the broad scope and consequences of the Tal Law‘s exemptions, as
well as suggesting that the refusal of some individuals to serve is ―unjustified‖).
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Orthodox community. This sort of transferability would serve
as a partial preference-revealing mechanism vis-à-vis community members and, at the same time, allow for community leaders to fine-tune the ultimate allocation of exemptions, including
through the imposition of social and religious sanctions and
rewards.121 Restricting the group of potential transferees ensures the internalization of the benefits by the community, thereby preserving the distribution of conscription duties across
communities in line with the social planner‘s initial intention,
while preventing a spillover of the exemption phenomenon into
other sectors of society.122
As to the Mode of Transfer Axis, in the context of conscription exemptions, autonomy considerations validate the borderline between the gift and barter categories. Personhood concerns tilt against a quid-pro-quo exchange of military
exemption rights for two reasons. First, the exchange of exemptions rights for other resources would dilute their expressive
value as a sign of excellence in religious scholarship. Second,
the commodification of the interaction would taint the altruistic
nature of the transfer of the exemption right to fellow community members and would transform communal bonds.123 The
borderline between inalienability and gift on this axis is supported by participation considerations. By transferring the conscription exemption to another member of his community, the
transferor affects the ultimate distribution of the exemption
rights. The gift regime, unlike total inalienability, thus allows
individuals to participate in the decision-making process re-

121. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of selfregulation of a community by its leaders, see Anthony Ogus, Rethinking SelfRegulation, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 97, 97–99 (1995) (arguing that advantages of self-regulation include better access to information and expertise,
lower monitoring costs, and the internalization of administrative costs, and
arguing that the disadvantages of self-regulation include the potential for
rent-seeking behavior and abuse of power by community leaders themselves).
122. For an example of how the group of potential transferees who may
benefit from the Tal Law‘s conscription exemption is restricted, see Medina,
supra note 119 (explaining that the current policy in Israel is to grant exemptions to ultra-Orthodox Jews while denying the same sort of exemption from
military conscription to individuals who refuse to serve based on non-religious
grounds, including opposition to the Israel Defense Forces‘ policies).
123. Cf., e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 947 (providing an example
of how commodification of gifts may impact altruism by discussing the implications of allowing individuals to purchase donated blood and suggesting that
turning blood into a saleable commodity might actually deter donors who
thought they were providing a ―gift‖ from donating blood).
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garding the allocation of exemptions, and derivatively, who will
engage in religious studies.124
G. INALIENABILITY: VOTING RIGHTS
Category A encompasses inalienable PEs. The cases falling
under this category are distinguishable from other classes of
cases in that declining to exercise these rights results in their
complete waiver (as opposed to non-exercise only by the initial
rights-holder). The paradigmatic case under Category A is voting rights. Unlike in the case of pollution quotas, the allocation
of inalienable voting rights stems from a social precommitment to their equal distribution among the public (one
vote per person, regardless of social or political status).125 Under prevailing law, one cannot buy someone else‘s voting right
to augment one‘s own voting power (i.e., cast two votes instead
of one in support of the political candidate that one favors), nor
can votes be bought in order to silence the supporter of a political opponent (i.e., to diminish the political support of the buyer‘s least-favored candidate).126 In the terms of our model, voting rights can thus be described as a paradigmatic Category A
case.127 On the Potential Transferees Axis—in the efficiency/
distribution tradeoff—the normative equilibrium therefore gravitates towards distribution, since efficiency considerations do
124. In fact, for ultra-Orthodox Jews, this decision may amount to vicarious participation in Bible scholarship. Supporting Bible scholarship by others is an ideal in and of itself under Judaic Law and is considered the equivalent of Bible studying by the supporter in terms of the spiritual virtuousness it
offers. See DIANE TICKTON SCHUSTER, JEWISH LIVES, JEWISH LEARNING:
ADULT JEWISH LEARNING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 52–54 (2003) (encouraging Jewish adults to support others‘ Jewish learning by reinforcing such practice through encouragement and reward).
125. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 963 (arguing that ―[v]ote selling
is widely recognized to be inconsistent with egalitarian, democratic principles
because it biases political decisions in favor of the wealthy‖).
126. See Hasen, supra note 18, at 1324 n.1 (discussing the legal consequences of ―vote buying‖ in the United States). Other examples of inalienable
PEs include entitlements of the regulatory and welfare states, such as social
security and welfare benefits. See Radin, supra note 42, at 1854 n.20. With respect to the Mode of Transfer Axis, the very ability not to consume food
stamps, a form of welfare benefits, allows eligible consumers to dissociate
themselves from other needy individuals and reflects respect for their nonmaterial preferences. As far as efficiency and distribution considerations are
concerned, waiver promotes efficient distribution of such benefits by acting as
a preference-revealing mechanism.
127. But see Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 137
(2000) (challenging the traditional opposition to vote buying in the corporate law
context and pointing to circumstances where such buying may be desirable).
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not unequivocally support marketability in this case.128 Though
at first glance selling votes for money seems like a good way to
allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences, it also
would generate substantial costs.129 Critics note a host of inefficiencies entailed by vote trading, including the negative externalities that could be imposed on the public at large when vote
buyers attempt to rent-seek by using their post-election political power and access to the public treasury to pay for their exante vote buying.130 Another source of inefficiency is the potential for ―coalitions of vote buyers and sellers to monopolistically
prevent competition for the sale of votes.‖131 A third concern,
raised by Levmore, relates to collective action problems associated with vote selling.132
The distributive argument against vote trading is premised
upon its regressive effects. If vote buying were allowed, the
poor would likely sell their votes to the rich, due to their disparate financial capabilities as well as the decreasing marginal
utility of money.133 Not only would this result in the exclusion
of the poor from the public decision-making arena, but it would
also have an adverse effect because ―candidates chosen in elections where the wealthy buy the votes of the poor more likely
128. For an analysis of vote buying from an efficiency perspective, see Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel, On the Efficiency of Vote Buying When Voters Have Common Interests, 26 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 536 (2006) (exploring
the efficiency of vote buying in the specific context of corporate elections).
129. See Levmore, supra note 127, at 118 (noting that markets are more
likely to do a better job of optimizing goods-production by sending the right
signals to producers than are individual voters).
130. See Epstein, supra note 29, at 984 –88 (discussing various negative
externalities stemming from the sale of voting rights in both corporate and political contexts).
131. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 272 (1962).
132. See Levmore, supra note 127, at 123. Levmore states that:
[ I ]f vote selling were legal, many entitled individuals would sell their
votes at trivial prices even as these voters recognize that a large block
of votes is a valuable asset. But it does no good for an individual to
hold out for the value that a buyer might attach to each vote in such a
block because there are many other potential sellers willing to part
with their shares for some trivial price. Absent some coordination
strategy, these voters reason that since others will sell at a low price
rather than be left holding essentially worthless rights, they too may
as well sell at a price greater than zero but far less than what might
be obtained from an eager buyer if these sellers could coordinate.
Id.
133. Hasen, supra note18, at 1325 (noting that the poor are more likely to
sell their votes than are the wealthy, thereby leading to a regressive system in
which political outcomes favor the wealthy).
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will reflect the views of the wealthy.‖134 In other words, if the
wealthy were able to purchase additional shares in the political
process, they would be able to take over the process and intensify
the disproportionality in decision-making power in society.135
On the Mode of Transfer Axis, the preclusion of vote trading stems from the relative weightiness of personhood and participation considerations. Indeed, translating votes into monetary currency seems to fundamentally contradict the essence of
what it means to be a part of a democratic society. It has been
asserted that voting is not only about preference satisfaction or
personal gain, but also about the realization of one‘s civic personhood.136 In light of what Sandel terms ―the republican ideals
implicit . . . in contemporary democratic practice,‖ the experience of collective decision-making is distinct from and greater
than the sum of individual votes.137 Something important is
missing, therefore, when a single right is sold for personal gain.
In addition to its detrimental impact on civic personhood, marketability creates negative effects in the commodification of the
interaction between the parties. As Levmore has noted,
―[p]erhaps the most defensible or intuitive form of the anticommodification argument stresses the communal nature of
voting; a voting right is like an invitation to a party, and both
are nontransferable for the same externality reason.‖138
Participation considerations also bear considerable weight
in the context of voting rights, pulling towards inalienability.
As we argued in the framework of the justifications for alienability on participation grounds, markets tend to decentralize
decision-making power in society and, therefore, restrain the
centralistic, otherwise absolute, state power.139 In the case of
134. Id. at 1330.
135. See id. (arguing that ―[e]ven if the poor would be willing to accept
money in return for giving up the right to vote,‖ egalitarians would object to
this sale based on the belief that the rich and poor should have equal influence
over political outcomes).
136. Karlan, supra note 39 (arguing that ―the right to vote serves a powerful expressive function‖ and captures the ideal of ―civic inclusion‖); see also
Sandel, supra note 99, at 114 –18.
137. Sandel, supra note 99, at 118; see also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4,
at 963 (noting that although voting, on the one hand, is seen as a private act,
it also demands well-informed decision making because of its effect on the
larger democratic society).
138. Levmore, supra note 127, at 116; see also ANDERSON, supra note 22, at
164 –65 (noting that certain social spheres and values are governed by participation in social practices and cannot be effectively governed by market principles).
139. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 7–22.
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voting rights, we posited, marketability seems to add another
layer of decentralization on top of the initial allocation of these
rights, which, in itself, approximates the decentralizing effect
of the market by providing each citizen with a voice and with
marginal decision-making power. However, in light of the possibility of capture and cartelization in a market for votes, it
could in fact be claimed that a market in voting rights would
operate against the initial decentralization and concentrate decision-making power in the hands of the affluent.140
Since distributive, personhood, and participation objections
to alienability play such a central role in the normative equilibrium in the context of voting rights, and since efficiency gains
from trade in voting rights are dwarfed by the costs entailed,
the inalienability in Category A would seem to be the natural
choice for this particular PE. However, similar to what we
claimed in the context of the pollution quota debate, with voting rights, non-tradability need not collapse into complete inalienability. Instead, our model offers non-binary options along
a spectrum of alienability mechanisms: some of the personhood
and participation concerns raised with regard to trade in voting
rights could be addressed by moving along the Mode of Transfer Axis to the Gift Row, perhaps even to the Barter Row. In
other words, these concerns can be contended with through
alienability mechanisms that prohibit selling votes but, at the
same time, allow voting rights to be donated to others (gift) or
even exchanged for a similar kind of consideration (barter), as
in the 2000 presidential election example opening this paper.141
140. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31, at 1098.
141. The distinction between barters and trade in votes was recognized in
the Nader vote swapping case, where the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit ruled that ―[w]hatever the wisdom of using vote swapping
agreements to communicate . . . [voters‘] positions, such agreements plainly
differ from conventional (and illegal) vote buying, which conveys no message
other than the parties‘ willingness to exchange votes for money (or some other
form of private profit).‖ Porter v. Bowen, 496 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2007).
In addition, the court indicated that vote buying may be prohibited ―‗without
trenching on any right of association protected by the First Amendment.‘‖ Id.
(quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982)). Yet vote swapping, the
court noted, involves a ―‗promise to confer some ultimate benefit on the voter,
qua . . . citizen[ ] or member of the general public‘‖ and the only benefit a vote
swapper can receive is a ―marginally higher probability that his preferred electoral outcome will come to pass‖ or, in our terminology, the exchange takes
place within a single scale of valuation. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Brown 456 U.S. at 55).
As to the gift alternative, Rose-Ackerman posits, ―[s]ince voters who pull
party levers or follow the endorsements of The New York Times are de facto
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III. ALIENABLE TAX BENEFITS FOR CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS
Our discussion has hereto dealt with aligning different
mechanisms of PE alienability with their underlying normative
considerations. This correlation between normative equilibria
and alienability techniques is the essence of our project: to provide any given normative equilibrium envisioned by society regarding a particular PE with the fitting alienability mechanism. This theoretical framework obviously is context
contingent. The discussion below will devise one possible context in the sphere of PEs, namely, the hypothetical framework
of a market in tax incentives for charitable contributions. Viewing tax incentives through our model‘s lens and through the
prism of its flexible conception of alienability illustrates the
benefits in converting PEs into alienable rights.142 We start out
by reviewing the rare cases of alienable tax benefits and argue
that there is no inherent reason to restrict tax benefit alienability to these particular settings or to oppose the alienability of
the vast majority of tax benefits. We demonstrate the prospects
for expansion of the alienability of tax benefits beyond the ex-

donating their votes, why not permit more formal assignments which, like
corporate proxies, can be revoked at any time before the election?‖ RoseAckerman, supra note 4, at 963. In line with our discussion above, the move
from inalienability to gift, which would allow donation of voting rights, would
provide the initial right-holder with another avenue of participation even if
she transfers her right. She would not only be able to exercise or waive her
right to vote, but also to indirectly participate in the decision-making process
when transferring it to others, who might enjoy a comparative advantage in
terms of information or decision-making capacity. In this sense, the transfer of
votes enhances the power of a single vote and enriches the ways in which it
can be used beyond electing one‘s favorite candidate in a direct manner.
Thus, our model accommodates a variety of normative equilibria in terms
of participation: if passive participation is more essential, then Category A will
prove the superior mechanism; if active participation is considered more important, Categories D or E will be preferable. A similar analysis holds with
respect to the varying nuances of personhood and commodification. If the objection to alienability of voting rights centers on the monetization of the right
to vote and is less concerned with the commodification of the interaction and
its effect on the community, then under our model, sale would be disallowed
but not necessarily exchanged in-kind by logrolling.
142. The analysis in this paper does not mandate a decisive position in the
larger debate regarding the dichotomy between ―core‖ tax provisions and tax
expenditures. Our project is not prescriptive in its nature but rather is aimed
at matching alienability techniques with specific normative equilibria (which
are the product of political deliberation). Thus, the tax expenditure question,
like other base-line issues, remains beyond the scope of this paper.
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isting categories by looking into the example of alienable tax
benefits for charitable contributions.
A. ALIENABLE TAX MECHANISMS
Tax attributes are ordinarily assumed to be inalienable,
making them a classic Category A case under our model.143
Some rare exceptions do exist. A well-known example is the
―safe harbor leasing rules‖ of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981.144 Under this Act generous tax benefits (credits and deductions) provided to various industries were made transferable.145 Companies that could not use the benefits were effectively permitted to transfer them by providing safe harbor
leasing.146 This safe harbor regime was repealed by Congress
143. See SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 18 (criticizing the conventional wisdom
that maintains ―[p]rovisions that are labeled ‗tax benefits‘ are not supposed to
be tradable‖). Despite formal inalienability, tax planners have developed a
host of mechanisms to enable de facto trade in their tax attributes. Cf. id. at
54 (describing the tax planner‘s job as ―finding pinpricks in the law and driving trucks through them‖). Various forms of tax arbitrage facilitate trade in
attributes, ranging from deductions (e.g., depreciation or childcare expenses)
that lower taxable income, to losses that could offset taxable income, to credits
(e.g., affordable housing credits or foreign tax credits) that may lower tax liability, to specific exemptions (e.g., a tax exemption for non-profits or for people
with disabilities). See I.R.S. Pub. 17-10311G (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf. Traditionally, such attributes are offered to a
selected group of taxpayers who either earned the right to hold them (e.g., lost
money or invested in affordable housing) or have certain unique features (e.g.,
are disabled or are working parents). See id. In practice, however, a variety of
planning tools have emerged—often to the dismay of the tax authorities—that
allow some of these attributes to be enjoyed by taxpayers other than the original beneficiaries. Cf. Laura Saunders, 30 Last-Minute Tax Tips, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 2, 2011, at B7, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034615
04576230743028469786.html. Accordingly, depreciation deductions are being
traded through leasing transactions, losses are shifted through stripping
mechanisms or flow-through entities, and credits are exchanged through exdividend transactions or by partnering with taxpayers who can actually use
them. Cf. Batchelder, supra note 10, at 33 n.36 (detailing how some tax credits
are sold by developers to syndicated partnerships that recruit investors who
can use the tax credit to become limited partners in the project). These practices, however, are restricted to those who can afford the high fees of tax planners and the risk and potential costs of litigation. Cf. id. at 30 (describing the
administrative and compliance costs associated with refundable credits).
144. The safe harbor provision was found in § 168(f )(8) of the Internal Revenue Code and was enacted in Title II, § 201(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 203 (repealed 1982). For a detailed overview of safe-harbor leasing, see generally Alvin C. Warren, Jr. &
Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe
Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752 (1982).
145. See Warren & Auerbach, supra note 144, at 1762.
146. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 11, at 17–18. Shaviro describes this safe
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the very next year in the face of public protest and a higher
than expected budget deficit.147 Another, more recent, example
of alienable tax benefits can be found under Louisiana‘s film
and TV tax credit program, approved by the State Legislature
in 2002.148 According to this program, the State grants marketable tax credits worth up to 30 percent of the movie production
costs.149 Out-of-state companies often sell the excess credits to
Louisiana-based firms or individual taxpayers, who then use
them to reduce their tax liability.150 Similar arrangements have
been applied in Louisiana with regard to companies partnering
with Louisiana universities under the State‘s Technical Commercialization Credit Program.151 In Virginia, the 2002
Amendment to the Land Conservation Act of 1999152 provides
another example of alienable tax benefits, allowing landowners
to sell tax credits given for conservation easements to other
taxpayers.153 In addition to these existing tradable benefit regimes, there have been proposals to provide transferable tax
benefits to financial institutions managing Individual Development Accounts (IDAs).154
Though these examples illustrate the viability of making
tax attributes alienable, the current frameworks represent only
the very margins of the tax arena. We maintain that serious
consideration should be given to making tax attributes alienable on a broader scale. Like in other regulatory areas, alienable
tax attributes offer a promising venue site for tax policy.155 In
harbor as amounting to transfers of fees at arm‘s length, although the act did
not literally permit sale of these benefits. Id. at 18. For a detailed description
of the transfer technique, see id.
147. See id. (describing the roots of this public outrage as anchored in the
―fact that safe harbor leasing actually was working as intended‖).
148. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009).
149. Id. See also Overview: Production Incentives, LOUISIANA ECON. DEV.,
http://www.louisianaentertainment.gov/film/content.cfm?id=149 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2011) (providing a description of the law).
150. Overview: Production Incentives, LOUISIANA ECON. DEV., supra note
149 (―The incentives are fully transferable and Louisiana has no limit to the
amount of incentives that can be earned by a single production.‖).
151. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2352–2365 (2009) (renewed by 2011 La.
Acts. 416).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-513(C)(1) (2010).
153. See W. Eugene Seago, The Effects of the Virginia Land Preservation
Credit on Federal Taxable Income: Should the Right Hand Take From What
the Left Hand Gave?, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 1, 3 (2007).
154. See CARE Act of 2003, S. 476, 108th Cong. § 511 (2003) (cited in Batchelder et al., supra note 10, at 33 n.36).
155. Obviously, certain tax benefits would be less suitable than others as
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what follows, we use the normative infrastructure developed in
Part II to construct the appropriate alienability mechanisms
and design a market for tax attributes in the context of charitable contributions. We chose these particular tax attributes as
our test case since the discourse on tax benefits for charitable
contributions is premised upon a variety of teleological objectives.156 This multiplicity of ends allows us to move along the
two axes of our model in order to illustrate the nuanced distinctions and creative applications that we envision for alienable
PEs. We will demonstrate how moving away from box A (inalienable PEs) offers varying kinds and levels of benefits in this
particular context. Namely how, given particular budgetary
constraints on the public resources invested in charities, different forms of alienability prove superior to complete inalienability in terms of efficiency, distributive justice, autonomy, personhood, and participation. It will emerge that various
mechanisms of alienability along the spectrum (unrestricted
sale, restricted sale, restricted gift) can accommodate differentiated normative equilibria similar to those cases discussed in
Part II.
B. THE NORMATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF CHARITABLES
Tax benefits likely contribute to the size and success of the
charitable sector.157 There are many ways to design a tax system that supports charitable contributions (and, even more so,
that supports charitable organizations).158 Some possibilities
are direct subsidies,159 tax exemptions for charitable organizations,160 or tax incentives directed at contributors to these or-

objects of transfer. For example, one may distinguish between allocational and
distributive tax expenditures in this regard. For a discussion of this distinction
in the context of a general anti-avoidance rule, see Tim Edgar, Building a Better GAAR, 27 VA. TAX REV. 833 (2008). Our purpose here is only to provide an
illustrative example of the potential benefits of alienability in the tax context,
depending upon the promotion of pre-determined normative ends and following a political deliberation process. The precise guidelines for when alienability would prove preferable for the provision of a specific tax benefit are beyond
the scope of our current project.
156. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 507–11
(2010).
157. Id. at 513–14.
158. See id. at 511–13.
159. See id. at 517.
160. See id. at 511–13.
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ganizations.161 Our discussion will focus on the third alternative: tax benefits for contributors.
Opinions vary as to the focal point of the justification for
such benefits.162 Whereas some traditional scholars regard the
deduction for charitable contributions to be merely a proper
way of measuring income,163 contemporary scholars tend to
emphasize that the deduction for charitable contributions is a
subsidy for the promotion of desirable social goals.164 As such,
these benefits give rise to a need for further inquiry into their
underlying normative justifications.
One line of reasoning justifies tax benefits for charitable
contributions on distributional grounds.165 Under this line of
argument, charities tend to serve the weaker segments of society, and subsidization is thus a form of redistribution.166 Others
contest this reasoning on empirical grounds, claiming that
many charitable organizations cater to the needs of the affluent
rather than the poor (e.g., opera houses, theaters, and museums).167 Yet others emphasize the efficiency perspective,
holding that tax attributes correct market failures, which derive from information deficiencies and free-riding tendencies in
the market for charity.168 The thrust of this argument is that
charities provide mixed public goods that confer non-excludable
and non-rivalrous positive externalities on the public at
large.169 Absent state subsidization, free-riding would lead to
under-supply of these goods and services.170 Other scholars em161. See id. at 511.
162. Id. at 513–14.
163. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax,
86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 313–15 (1972); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal
Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 344 (1989) (summarizing
Andrews‘ model).
164. Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions,
84 IND. L.J. 1047, 1058 (2009); David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 533 (2006).
165. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 164, at 562–64 (summarizing current distributional theory scholarship).
166. See id. at 563 (―On the other hand, many charities subsidized by the
deduction do cater to worse-off persons and thereby effect a progressive redistribution of welfare organizations.‖).
167. Id. at 562–63; see Henry Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing Arts, 12 BELL J. ECON. 341, 342 (1981).
168. See, e.g., Benshalom, supra note 164, at 1058–62.
169. Id. at 1058–59.
170. Id. at 1059 (―Through contributions, charitable organizations increase
their supply and lower the prices of the public goods they provide. Charitable
relief also mitigates the free-riding problem by reducing the price of contribu-
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phasize the information benefits of privatizing the decisionmaking process regarding the ultimate destination of the public
funded subsidies.171 By allowing the public to decide which
charities enjoy public support, rather than being determined by
central planning through direct grants, the regulator reaps the
benefits of the synergy of private information.172 This allows for
more informed and efficient funneling of public resources.173
Furthermore, tax benefits for charitable contributions serve as
a preference-revealing mechanism, in that private donations
are a prerequisite for public support. Only those private donors
expressing a high demand for the given charity enjoy greater
public support of their chosen charity, and vice versa.174 Public
choice considerations have also been raised in support of decentralizing the decision-making process. As Levmore asserts, the
involvement of taxpayers in this process mitigates rent-seeking
opportunities that might otherwise affect the legislative
process.175
In addition to the efficiency-based considerations underlying tax benefits for charitable contributions, writers in the field
have raised participation-based rationales: ―subsidies are warranted because a democratic process dependent on majority
preferences will only supply public goods at a level demanded
by the median voter.‖176 Tax benefits for charitable contributions allow individuals with a vision of the public good that is
distinct from that held by the majority to redirect some of the
public resources toward their particular vision.177 In this way,
tax benefits perform the unique political function of bypassing
the majoritarian decision-making process: not only affecting the
channeling of public resources but also expanding the choicemaking capacity of individuals.178 Levmore offers an interesting
twist to the participation argument in this context, suggesting
that such active and direct participation by the taxpaying public in the decision-making process regarding which projects are
funded, enhances the commitment to these charities.179 Finally,
tions and encouraging more private giving to underprovided social goods.‖).
171. See, e.g., id. at 1061.
172. See id. at 1061–62.
173. See id. at 1062.
174. See Fleischer, supra note 156, at 527.
175. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 408 (1998).
176. Fleischer, supra note 156, at 521.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Levmore, supra note 175, at 405–06.
179. Levmore, supra note 175, at 406.
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tax benefits for charitable contributions have also been justified
on personhood grounds. Charitable organizations operate outside the market realm, are constructed on altruistic motivations, and constitute non-market scales of valuation.180 There is
room to claim that these non-market associations enrich society
in facilitating alternative routes of human interaction.181
In sum, granting tax benefits for charitable contributions
promotes various value-based ends that are external to the particular goods and services provided by the charities: distributive justice, efficiency, participation, autonomy, and personhood. Different normative equilibria emerge from different
mixes of these considerations. We will now proceed to match
mechanisms of alienability to these various equilibria.
1. Unrestricted Sale of Charitable Benefits
Under prevailing U.S. law, itemizing taxpayers are allowed
a deduction of up to 50 percent of their adjusted gross income182
for contributions to tax-exempt organizations.183 This deduction
mechanism has a regressive effect, in that it allows highincome taxpayers to reap greater benefits from their contributions as a result of their higher marginal tax rate, while individuals lacking tax liability are deprived of this benefit.184 In a
recent article Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., and Peter R. Orszag propose, instead, a uniform refundable tax credit
180. See David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221,
225–28 (2009).
181. See ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 164 –65. For an application in the
tax context, see Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REV. 93
(2009), which argues that charitable organizations and charitable donations
can be conceived of as another point along a spectrum of activities that are ordered according to their relation to personhood. This spectrum ranges from
unrealized talents (endowment), to self-provided services (imputed income), to
the provision of services within families and their mutual provision among
friends (gifts). Id. at 115–30. ―Such a spectrum can further be extended to include . . . charitable contributions, where tax credits can be explained as a
subsidy for nonmarket (not-for-profit) institutions.‖ Id. at 135. The tax treatment of these activities can (and, in many cases, does) reflect a degree of (non-)
commodification correlating to their position on the spectrum. Id. at 131. In
other words, the current support for charitable contributions is a form of fostering altruistic, non-market behavior as a good in and of itself.
182. I.R.C. § 170( b)(1) (2006); see also id. § 170( b)(1)(G) (defining ―contribution base‖ as ―adjusted gross income‖).
183. Such organizations must promote religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational ends. Id. § 170(c).
184. See Batchelder et al., supra note 10.
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equal to a fixed percentage of tax payers‘ contribution.185 The
authors point to the efficiency-based virtues of such a tax regime for all tax incentives, charitable incentives included.186
It is our claim, however, that even such a non-regressive,
one-size-fits-all mechanism has substantial downsides in terms
of efficiency and participation. From the efficiency angle, the
refundable credit mechanism misallocates incentives on both
the high end and the low end of the target population, leading
to a waste of public resources. Due to the uniform nature of the
tax benefit, there will be contributors for whom lower tax incentives would have sufficed to motivate them to make an identical contribution and who now receive unnecessary excessive
benefits. The mirror image of the misallocation problem relates
to those taxpayers interested in contributing above the cap, if
provided with a tax benefit, who would forego the additional
contribution absent the tax incentive. For simplicity we will hereby refer to both manifestations of the misallocation of incentives phenomenon as a problem of over- and underinclusiveness. We argue that making the tax credit alienable
will entail efficiency gains on both fronts.187
In addition to its efficiency drawback, the refundable credit
mechanism also hinders participation in the decision-making
process regarding the channeling of tax benefits. Specifically, it
limits involvement exclusively to contributors and correlates
the extent of their impact with contribution level. One could
argue that the decision-making capacities as to the allocation of
public funds (as opposed to personal resources) should not be
assigned according to ability or willingness to contribute to
charity. If that is the case, we should note that the credit mechanism marginalizes the influence of non-contributors on such
decisions and their ability to voice their preferences as to recipient charities of public funding. It is our contention that modifying this mechanism through resort to the alienability option
and adherence to the principles underlying our model could resolve these problems. Moreover, allowing for alienability of tax
benefits for charitable contributions would broaden the spec185. Id. at 43. An example of a uniform refundable tax credit is 20 cents
per dollar, irrespective of the taxpayer‘s liability. In order to sustain a budgetary constraint, the refundable credit must be capped at a certain level.
186. See id. at 43–57 (arguing that the default for all tax incentives for socially valued activities should be uniform refundable tax credits).
187. This is not to suggest that the proposed model ensures Pareto efficiency. Instead it is designed to allow for Pareto improvements in terms of level of
contribution for a given public expenditure.
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trum of choices offered to individuals, in a way that furthers
their autonomy as well as assists in the realization of distributive goals.
We shall begin with the efficiency considerations. The
claim we will formulate in this regard is that alienability can
mitigate waste of public resources and increase the overall sum
of contributions per given public expenditure on subsidies for
charity.188 In other words, alienability could lead to Pareto improvement189 over parallel inalienable regimes. The underlying
intuition is that since taxpayers vary in their preferences for
charitable contributions, and thus in the marginal benefits they
derive from donations, granting a uniform benefit is bound to
be high for some taxpayers and low for others. Absent the option of alienability, the obvious solution to the overinclusiveness problem (reduction of the benefit) could aggravate
the under-inclusiveness problem (creating an incentive which is
too low for those with a low preference for donations). Alternatively, one could suggest increasing the cap to allow for more
contributions by high-preference taxpayers. Unfortunately, this
option will not work either, as it is likely to break the given
budgetary constraint.
Therefore, improving efficiency under a given budget requires fine-tuning of the high-end incentive (so as not to provide excessive subsidies for contributors) while preserving the
level of contributions. Alienability offers an attractive policy option here: Allowing taxpayers to sell their tax credits will let
the government break its given budget into smaller incentive
packages and thus mitigate the over-inclusiveness problem. At
the same time, it would neutralize the risk of underinclusiveness by increasing the number of such packages and
creating a market for tax benefits that will efficiently allocate
them. This market would facilitate the purchase of tax benefits
beyond a given cap: individuals wishing to contribute in excess
of the cap but still enjoy tax benefits for the surplus would be
able to purchase those benefits from individuals uninterested
in contributing to charity. These market features would allow
for a modular and differential consumption of benefits, better
188. It should be noted that the proposed model is not aimed at reaching
the optimal subsidy-contribution ratio. Rather, it assumes a pre-determined
social decision as to how many public resources should be designated in order
to induce contributions in society, and the model seeks its optimal targeting so
as to maximize contribution level under a budgetary constraint.
189. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 18 (5th ed. 1997) (describing the Pareto principle).
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suited to the incentive structure for donations and thus leading
to the channeling of tax benefits to their most efficient users.
2. Example:
To illustrate this point, assume the government is interested in spending $2000 to support charitable contributions and
that the taxpaying population is comprised of twenty taxpayers
with varying levels of preference for charitable contributions.
For purposes of clarity, assume a random distribution of preferences for contributions, expressed in the table below as the
monetary benefits of making a $500 contribution. These range
from $300 to $480 for each taxpayer. Suppose the government
provides each taxpayer with a uniform benefit of $200 per $500
contribution. This will lead to 10 contributions (marked in
bold) of $500, totaling $5000 in charitable donations, at a social cost of $2000.
Figure 2:
Benefit
from a
contribution
of $500

A

084

Benefit
from a
contribution
of an
additional
$500
460

Benefit
from a
contribution
of an
additional
$500
440

Benefit
from a
contribution
of an
additional
$500
420

Benefit
from a
contribution
of an
additional
$500
400

Benefit
from a
contribution
of an
additional
$500
380

B

064

440

420

400

380

360

C

004

420

400

380

360

340

D

024

400

380

360

340

320

E

044

380

360

340

320

300

F

084

360

340

320

300

280

G

064

340

320

300

280

260

H

004

320

300

280

260

I

024

300

280

400

J

044

280

400
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Such a mechanism would suffer from the overinclusiveness problem described above, in that it would provide
a $200 benefit to taxpayers who would have contributed $500
even with a lower tax incentive (Donors A–I). Attempting to
rectify this by reducing the benefit (say to $100 per $500 contribution) would lead to 5 contributors only (Donors A–E), for a
total of $2500 in contributions at a social cost of $500. Though
the subsidy-contribution ratio is improved, the result is still
suboptimal in light of the lower total level of contributions.
In addition to over-inclusiveness, such a regime also generates under-inclusiveness, for it limits the amount of subsidized
contribution to $500 even for taxpayers who may be interested
in contributing more if given subsidization. It might appear
that the under-inclusiveness phenomenon could be remedied by
lifting the subsidized contribution cap. This would, indeed, increase the level of contributions, but at the same time could
lead to excessive social subsidization of charities. For example,
if the cap is increased to $1000—namely, a $400 benefit is
granted per $1000 contribution—this will result in 9 contributions (Donors A–I) of $1000 each, totaling $9000 in charity at a
social cost of $3600.
Though this would yield a better subsidy-contribution ratio, the social investment would exceed the desired $2000 level.
In other words, though the government has an interest in facilitating charities, this is not without limit: since it essentially
functions as a partner that subsidizes individual contributions,
the government has an interest in limiting the aggregate level
of such public participation, regardless of the prospect of greater participation by contributors in charities.
Against this background, now assume that the tax benefits
were alienable. Under the alienability regime, the overinclusiveness problem is mitigated by allocating only a smaller
$100 benefit per $500 contribution. The decrease in the initial
benefit would save $100 per contributor for Contributors A–E.
On the other hand, it will crowd out Contributors F–J, seemingly exacerbating under-inclusiveness. However, allowing individuals to purchase unused benefits would result in Donors
A–E purchasing and contributing nine additional benefit pack-
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ages190 more than offsetting this effect. This will result in 14
contributions of $500 each, totaling $7000 in charity at a social
cost of $1400, a considerable improvement from the original
$5000 in contributions raised with $2000 of public money.
It is certainly possible to imagine other ways of simultaneously resolving both ends of the inclusiveness problem.191
190. Those underlined in the following table:
Contribu- $500
addiaddiadditor/Contr
tional tional
tional
ibution of
$500
$500
$500

additional
$500

addi
tion
al
$50
0

A
B

084
064

460
440

440
420

420
400

400
380

380
360

C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J

004
024
044
083
063
043
023
033

420
400
380
360
340
320
300
280

400
380
360
340
320
300
280
400

380
360
340
320
300
280
400

360
340
320
300
280
260

340
320
300
280
260

191. Another regulatory remedy for both inclusiveness problems would be
setting a minimal contribution amount as a precondition for the tax benefit. A
floor would be beneficial under the plausible circumstances of decreasing marginal utility with relation to the size of contribution. For example, in the table
from footnote 190, setting a $2000 floor would allow us to provide only $440 in
benefits (the average of the marginal contributor, expressed in the fourth row
of the table). This would lead to four contributions of $2000 (totaling $8000 in
charity) at a social cost of $1760. Yet, even under such conditions, marketability may prove superior, for it opens the way to consolidation of contributions by
different contributors or, conversely, to fragmentation of the benefit. In other
words, the market strategy of consolidation may address under-inclusion in
cases of individuals who have difficulty meeting the minimal contribution requirement and, therefore, do not participate in charitable contribution.
Consolidation enables such individuals to cooperate with others in a way
that will increase their overall contribution level. Thus, in our illustration
from footnote 190, if there were more than a single contributor in each row,
Contributor E for instance, could join other similar contributors (not described
in the table) in contributing $500 each. Yet the possibility of consolidation
could lead to less desirable situations, where individuals who would be induced to meet the floor even without the consolidation option would, given the
option, cooperate with others in a similar situation, thereby decreasing their
aggregate level of contribution. For example, in the illustration from footnote
190, Contributor D, who might have been induced to contribute $2000 absent
the option of consolidation, could now choose to consolidate with others and
make only a partial contribution. The end result in terms of whether consoli-
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Tinkering with the cap and benefit amounts—for example, by
enlarging the former while lowering the latter—could lead to
an improvement in the level of contributions under a given
budgetary constraint, and given a preferences distribution
where a large bulk of the potential donors have a preference for
high contributions at a low tax incentive. However, this does
not run counter to our claim, for even under such an improved
regulatory regime, alienability might still lead to superior results. So long as there are individuals for whom the cap is too
low and others for whom the benefit is not great enough, the
possibility of trade may increase contributions per a given
budget.
We would like to conclude the discussion on the efficiency
perspective of alienable tax attributes by reiterating the purpose of our model. The thrust of our argument is not that the
alienability option achieves Pareto efficiency under any set of
circumstances. Rather, our claim is a more modest one, striving
merely to show that alienability could prove superior to the existing mechanisms (as well as those proposed by legal scholars)192 under a realistic set of assumptions regarding the inevitability of a budgetary cap on social subsidy of charitable
benefits and a plausible set of preference distributions. As a result, total disregard for the alienability option unnecessarily
constricts the social planner‘s choices from among the best
possible options.
Thus far, we have examined the efficiency of an alienability regime of tax benefits for charitable contributions. We now
move to considerations of participation. Recall that a central
justification of supporting charities by encouraging private contributions (as opposed to direct government funding) is the participation of the public in the decision-making process regarding which charities garner public support.193 It is our claim that
a market for tax attributes would enhance participation in the
decision-making process by including even non-contributors in
it. Indeed, providing individuals with a public benefit they can
either realize (through contribution) or sell to others (who will
realize the benefit through contribution) gives them the option
dation would improve the level of contribution is essentially an empirical matter: it all depends on the ratio of these two groups of individuals between those
with difficulties in meeting the floor and those who, absent the consolidation
option, would have met the floor.
192. See, e.g., Batchelder, supra note 10.
193. See Benshalom, supra note 164, at 1061–62; Fleischer, supra note 156,
at 521.
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of voicing their preferences even if they make no contribution to
charity. Such individuals could also sell their benefits to the
charities of their choice. By so doing, they would be able to
channel public funds to their preferred charity even if they
cannot afford to or simply choose not to contribute.194 On the
other hand, allowing non-contributors to take part in the public
participation may have a downside as well, as non-contributors
may be less committed to the ideas they support, since such a
mechanism does not require them to put their money where
their mouths are.
Distribution and personhood considerations seem to have
less of an effect on the unrestricted sale category, and yet there
is something to be said with respect to each of them: allowing
taxpayers to sell tax credits for a price may promote wealth redistribution, if, as a general matter, buyers of such credits are
better off than sellers. Under this scenario wealthy individuals
will pay poor sellers for their unused credits, thus sharing the
tax benefit with them (meaning that a larger part of the tax
benefits would get into poor sellers‘ hands than under inalienable credits).
While a stronger inclination of the wealthy to contribute
than of the poor to contribute seems plausible, this is not necessarily the case; sellers may represent individuals who do not
wish to contribute rather than individuals who are unable to do
so. If the former is the case, alienability will not necessarily
further a more progressive redistribution of tax benefits. Still,
if people‘s low preference for contributions is negatively linked
with their income level—the bottom line would still be a more
progressive redistribution scheme.
As for personhood considerations, there may be room to
claim that the tradability of credits poses the risk of increasing
the commodification of charity giving. The mere provision of tax
credits for contributions has commodifying aspects in and of itself, for it incorporates a quid-pro-quo dimension into altruistic
giving. But allowing such credits to be sold seems to add another commodificatory layer, for it involves a market transaction
194. Even under a sale regime, some contributors may still prefer to abstain from direct exercise of their benefits, because doing so might taint the
altruistic element of the act of donating. Under the prevailing regime, this arrangement amounts to a simple waiver of the benefit, which thus returns to
the state. Under an alienability regime, however, such contributors could donate their benefit to the charity of their choice, either for resale under the unrestricted sale mechanism (Category H) or for use by other donors under the
unrestricted gift rubric (Category D).
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in which a price tag is being put on the altruistic dimension of
giving. A person with a high preference for giving will be inclined to pay a higher price for the credits. This is more commodifying in two ways. The first way is the exact price tag being put on the non-altruistic component of the donation (which
is more accurate and thus perhaps more commodifying than
the one-size-fits all tax benefit under an inalienable credit). The
other way is the commodification of the interaction between the
buyer and the seller (and not only between the donor and the
tax authorities, which rates them both according to their altruistic preferences).
3. Restricted Sale of Charitable Benefits
The move from a regime of unrestricted sale to restricted
sale of charitable benefits could be justified on distributive
grounds, for unrestricted sale in the context of tax attributes
could yield adverse effects in terms of distribution. To begin
with, it could amplify the influence of the better off and enable
them to direct public resources to the charities of their choice
by purchasing additional tax benefits for their increased contribution to such charities. This purchasing, in turn, could lead
to a disproportionate concentration of public resources in the
hands of charities that cater to the preferences of the better
off.195 If, for example, affluent individuals have a preference for
opera houses or theaters as charitable organizations,196 a regime allowing unrestricted sale of tax attributes could lead to
excessive public support of these institutions and to a biased
distribution of public resources.
Shifting to the Category G regime of restricted sale could
mitigate this undesirable distributive outcome. Limiting the
sale of tax benefits to non-profit organizations only, while prohibiting such trade with private individuals, could somewhat
constrain the ability of the better off to purchase excessive decision-making power. The poor, who typically are less inclined to
contribute, due to a lack of resources, would be able to sell their
tax benefits to the charities of their choice, with no accompanying regressive augmentation of the influence of the affluent.
This could, however, only partially remedy the distributional
bias, for stronger non-profit organizations (such as opera hous195. C.f., e.g., Pozen, supra note 164, at 562–63 (discussing similar potential implications under the charitable deduction structure).
196. Id. at 563 (recognizing opera houses as ―the quintessential exemplar of
a non-redistributive ‗public charity‘‖).
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es) might still wield an advantage in terms of ability to pay the
competitive price of the tax benefits (relative to weaker nonprofits). A possible solution would be to restrict potential transferees—for example, allowing only pre-specified non-profits to
purchase the tax benefits.
Of course, promoting distributional goals in this manner
may come at a cost in efficiency. Both types of restricted sale
regimes tinker with market forces by artificially decreasing
demand and increasing transaction costs. In addition, limiting
sale to pre-specified charities would, for its part, undercut the
advantages associated with public participation. Such a restriction provides the social planner with the ability to shape which
charities reap public funding, thereby re-incorporating centralized planning in what was meant to be a locus of decentralized
decision making. In sum, if the teleological goals underlying tax
benefits for charitable contributions gravitate towards distributive justice, the alienability mechanism most suited to such a
normative equilibrium is restricted sale. If, however, the efficiency considerations prove more central, an alienability regime of unrestricted sale will be superior.
4. Restricted Gifts of Charitable Benefits
Giving extra voice to the better off not only raises distributive concerns (related to the outcomes of the decision-making
process), but could also be problematic in the context of the deliberation procedure itself (irrespective of its end results). As
argued above, participation in the public discourse over the
channeling of public support to various charities is constitutive
of one‘s civic personhood and should, therefore, not be contingent solely upon contribution capabilities. The civic personhood
concern is reinforced by Levmore‘s claim that involvement in
the decision-making process, regarding public funding of nonprofits, facilitates social commitment to charity work and incentive to monitor charitable activity.197 Lastly, we must bear
in mind the benefits associated with the preservation of multiple spheres of valuation in this regard. As we asserted above,
such non-market associations enrich society in facilitating alternative avenues of human interaction. This array of concerns
shifts the focus from the Potential Transferees Axis to the
Mode of Transfer Axis and could justify moving from a sale regime to a gift regime in our model: the incommensurability of
197. Levmore, supra note 175, at 406.
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tax benefits across spheres of valuation would insulate the decision regarding the identity of the ultimate benefactors of the
particular tax attributes from monetary considerations. These
advantages come at a cost, of course: representation without
(non-)taxation enables individuals to impact decision-making
without putting their money where their mouths are. The question whether the pros outweigh the cons and the normative
weights that are to be attributed to the various personhood,
participation and efficiency considerations are all essentially
political issues, to be decided through public deliberation in
each given society. We do not aspire to resolve this political
matter ourselves. Rather, our claim is that if in a given society
considerations of civic personhood and preservation of altruistic
spheres are of significance, a gift regime may prove preferable
to that of sale.
CONCLUSION
This Article is an exercise in expanding the horizons of legal imagination by portraying a world where alienability of
public entitlements is a viable option, rather than a rare exception. The conceptualization of publicly provided benefits as
alienable entitlements was made possible by the two key components underlying our model—namely, the non-binary conceptualization of alienability, as well as the exposure of the overlooked interpersonal dimension of public entitlements.
Analyzing public entitlements through the nuanced alienability
prism enriches the understanding of the ways in which various
alienability regimes, as well as the public entitlements whose
scope they define, can be utilized to promote various normative
goals. Application of our theory of PE alienability to the unexplored terrain of tax benefits for charitable contributions provided a hands-on illustration of the potential of alienability as a
policy tool, and of the ways in which various alienability
mechanisms can be utilized to promote any given choice of
normative end

